GHSA-7QF6-H84J-8FQ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:21 – Updated: 2026-03-03 22:21Impact
Microsoft Teams media handling used mixed fetch paths for Graph metadata/content and attachment auth-retry flows. Some paths bypassed the shared SSRF guard model and created inconsistent host/DNS enforcement across redirect/fetch hops.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Latest published vulnerable version:
2026.2.25 - Affected range:
<= 2026.2.25 - Planned patched version for next release:
2026.2.26
Technical Details
The Microsoft Teams attachment/media code previously relied on plugin-local fetch behavior in parts of the flow, instead of uniformly using shared guarded fetch logic with pinned DNS + policy checks. This could allow policy drift and SSRF boundary inconsistency between channel/plugin paths.
The fix unifies this path by:
- routing Microsoft Teams Graph message/hosted-content/attachment fetches through shared SSRF-guarded fetch paths,
- routing auth-scope fallback attachment downloads through the same guarded policy model,
- centralizing hostname-suffix allowlist policy helpers in plugin-sdk so channel/plugins use the same allowlist normalization and policy construction behavior.
Fix Commit(s)
57334cd7d85174d5f951de01114fd5801b063564
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.25"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:21:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Impact\nMicrosoft Teams media handling used mixed fetch paths for Graph metadata/content and attachment auth-retry flows. Some paths bypassed the shared SSRF guard model and created inconsistent host/DNS enforcement across redirect/fetch hops.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.2.25`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.2.25`\n- Planned patched version for next release: `2026.2.26`\n\n## Technical Details\nThe Microsoft Teams attachment/media code previously relied on plugin-local fetch behavior in parts of the flow, instead of uniformly using shared guarded fetch logic with pinned DNS + policy checks. This could allow policy drift and SSRF boundary inconsistency between channel/plugin paths.\n\nThe fix unifies this path by:\n- routing Microsoft Teams Graph message/hosted-content/attachment fetches through shared SSRF-guarded fetch paths,\n- routing auth-scope fallback attachment downloads through the same guarded policy model,\n- centralizing hostname-suffix allowlist policy helpers in `plugin-sdk` so channel/plugins use the same allowlist normalization and policy construction behavior.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `57334cd7d85174d5f951de01114fd5801b063564`\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4",
"modified": "2026-03-03T22:21:59Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T22:21:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/57334cd7d85174d5f951de01114fd5801b063564"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Microsoft Teams media fetch paths bypass shared SSRF guard model"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.