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GHSA-8QQM-FP2Q-V734

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 21:49 – Updated: 2026-07-17 21:49
VLAI
Summary
Skipper: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-50197: an oversized body can bypass OPA deny-on-presence Rego policies
Details

Summary

A wrong policy can be an open door. You have to check input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body in your policy.

Description

Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-50197: an oversized declared-Content-Length body still hands OPA an empty parsed_body, so deny-on-presence Rego policies fail OPEN while the full payload reaches upstream.

The CVE-2026-50197 fix (commit 3152f3b0, PR #4041, v0.26.10) substituted expectedSize = maxBodyBytes only when req.ContentLength < 0 (chunked / HTTP/2 without content-length). But when a request declares a Content-Length larger than maxBodyBytes, expectedSize > maxBodyBytes, the body-extraction if is skipped entirely, and ExtractHttpBodyOptionally returns rawBodyBytes = nil — so OPA evaluates an empty parsed_body, while the full forbidden payload still flows to the upstream. A deny-on-presence policy (default allow = true; allow = false if input.parsed_body.<forbidden>) — the exact Rego shape the advisory describes — fails OPEN. The fix's own comment reasons only about ContentLength == -1; the oversized branch was never considered, and the added PoC test only covers small bodies.

Affected code

  • filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go ExtractHttpBodyOptionally: the expectedSize <= maxBodyBytes gate lets an oversized declared body fall through to return req.Body, nil, func() {}, nil (OPA sees an empty document).
  • Corroborated by Skipper's own unit test "Read body exhausting max bytes" ({ "welcome": "world" }, maxBodySize: 5bodyInPolicy: "").

Steps to reproduce

See attached docker-compose.yml (official golang image) + setup.sh + exploit.sh, which run a real Skipper proxy (proxytest) with a real OPA control plane (opasdktest), WithMaxRequestBodyBytes(32), policy allow = false if input.parsed_body.action == "delete", route * -> opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody("test") -> upstream: - {"action":"delete"} (19B ≤ 32) → 403 (denied). - {"action":"delete","pad":"X..64"} (> 32) → 200, upstream received the full body (BYPASS). - small chunked {"action":"delete"}403 (positive control: the original CVE is fixed).

(Library-tier: validated via Skipper's real proxy test harness, not a deploy of the official image; benign oracle = status diff + upstream-received body; no RCE.)

Impact

Deployments authorizing on request-body content via opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody + deny-on-presence Rego can be bypassed by inflating the request body past -open-policy-agent-max-request-body-size (default 1 MB); the full payload still reaches the upstream.

Mitigation

Document how policy owners should block requests with oversized body.

Example deny by default and use "allow if" no oversized body:

default allow := false

allow if {
    input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body == false
    # ... body-based conditions
}

Example allow by default and use "deny if" an oversized body:

default deny := false

deny if {
    input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body == true
    # ... body-based conditions
}

Documentation is published by https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.27.26

Credit

Reported as part of an incomplete-patch measurement study (responsible disclosure).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/zalando/skipper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.27.26"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-17T21:49:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA wrong policy can be an open door. \nYou have to check `input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body` in your policy.\n\n### Description\n\nIncomplete fix for CVE-2026-50197: an oversized declared-`Content-Length` body still hands OPA an empty `parsed_body`, so deny-on-presence Rego policies fail OPEN while the full payload reaches upstream.\n\nThe CVE-2026-50197 fix (commit `3152f3b0`, PR #4041, v0.26.10) substituted `expectedSize = maxBodyBytes`\nonly when `req.ContentLength \u003c 0` (chunked / HTTP/2 without content-length). But when a request declares a\n`Content-Length` larger than `maxBodyBytes`, `expectedSize \u003e maxBodyBytes`, the body-extraction `if` is\nskipped entirely, and `ExtractHttpBodyOptionally` returns `rawBodyBytes = nil` \u2014 so OPA evaluates an empty\n`parsed_body`, while the full forbidden payload still flows to the upstream. A deny-on-presence policy\n(`default allow = true; allow = false if input.parsed_body.\u003cforbidden\u003e`) \u2014 the exact Rego shape the\nadvisory describes \u2014 fails OPEN. The fix\u0027s own comment reasons only about `ContentLength == -1`; the\noversized branch was never considered, and the added PoC test only covers small bodies.\n\n### Affected code\n\n- `filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go` `ExtractHttpBodyOptionally`: the\n  `expectedSize \u003c= maxBodyBytes` gate lets an oversized declared body fall through to\n  `return req.Body, nil, func() {}, nil` (OPA sees an empty document).\n- Corroborated by Skipper\u0027s own unit test \"Read body exhausting max bytes\" (`{ \"welcome\": \"world\" }`,\n  `maxBodySize: 5` \u2192 `bodyInPolicy: \"\"`).\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nSee attached `docker-compose.yml` (official `golang` image) + `setup.sh` + `exploit.sh`, which run a real\nSkipper proxy (`proxytest`) with a real OPA control plane (`opasdktest`),\n`WithMaxRequestBodyBytes(32)`, policy `allow = false if input.parsed_body.action == \"delete\"`, route\n`* -\u003e opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody(\"test\") -\u003e upstream`:\n- `{\"action\":\"delete\"}` (19B \u2264 32) \u2192 **403** (denied).\n- `{\"action\":\"delete\",\"pad\":\"X..64\"}` (\u003e 32) \u2192 **200**, upstream received the full body (BYPASS).\n- small chunked `{\"action\":\"delete\"}` \u2192 **403** (positive control: the original CVE is fixed).\n\n(Library-tier: validated via Skipper\u0027s real proxy test harness, not a deploy of the official image; benign\noracle = status diff + upstream-received body; no RCE.)\n\n### Impact\n\nDeployments authorizing on request-body content via `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` + deny-on-presence Rego\ncan be bypassed by inflating the request body past `-open-policy-agent-max-request-body-size` (default\n1 MB); the full payload still reaches the upstream.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nDocument how policy owners should block requests with oversized body.\n\nExample deny by default and use \"allow if\" no oversized body:\n```rego\ndefault allow := false\n\nallow if {\n    input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body == false\n    # ... body-based conditions\n}\n```\n\nExample allow by default and use \"deny if\" an oversized body:\n```rego\ndefault deny := false\n\ndeny if {\n    input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body == true\n    # ... body-based conditions\n}\n```\n\nDocumentation is published by https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.27.26\n\n### Credit\n\nReported as part of an incomplete-patch measurement study (responsible disclosure).",
  "id": "GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T21:49:48Z",
  "published": "2026-07-17T21:49:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/security/advisories/GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.27.26"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Skipper: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-50197: an oversized body can bypass OPA deny-on-presence Rego policies"
}



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