GHSA-943Q-MWMV-HHVH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 23:32 – Updated: 2026-03-02 23:32
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval
Details

Summary

OpenClaw Gateway exposes an authenticated HTTP endpoint (POST /tools/invoke) intended for invoking a constrained set of tools. Two issues could combine to significantly increase blast radius in misconfigured or exposed deployments:

  • The HTTP gateway layer did not deny high-risk session orchestration tools by default, allowing a caller with Gateway auth to invoke tools like sessions_spawn / sessions_send and pivot into creating or controlling agent sessions.
  • ACP clients could auto-approve permission requests for risky tools with insufficient user interaction/guardrails, reducing the friction that should normally prevent silent execution or mutation.

Impact

If the Gateway is reachable by an attacker and they obtain a valid Gateway token, they may be able to:

  • Escalate from single-tool invocation to spawning/controlling sessions and reach command execution capabilities depending on tool policy and runtime environment.
  • Perform cross-session message injection via sessions_send.
  • In ACP-integrated scenarios, obtain unintended approvals for non-read/search tool permissions.

CVSS

  • CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.8)

Affected versions

  • openclaw < 2026.2.14

Fixed in

  • openclaw >= 2026.2.14

Remediation

The default behavior is now hardened:

  • PR #15390: deny high-risk tools over HTTP /tools/invoke by default (with gateway.tools.{allow,deny} overrides) and harden ACP permission handling.
  • Commit bb1c3dfe1: ACP clients now prompt for any non-read/search permission request (fail closed for mutating/execution/fetch operations).
  • Commit 539689a2f: security audit warns when gateway.tools.allow re-enables default-denied HTTP tools, since this can increase RCE blast radius if the Gateway is reachable.
  • Commit 153a7644e: ACP safe-kind inference is stricter to avoid accidental auto-approval due to substring matches (still auto-approves only confident read/search).

Mitigations / deployment guidance

  • Keep the Gateway loopback-only unless you have a strong reason not to: gateway.bind="loopback" / openclaw gateway run --bind loopback.
  • Avoid exposing the Gateway directly to the public internet. Use an SSH tunnel or Tailscale to access a loopback-bound Gateway.
  • Treat opting in to default-denied HTTP tools (via gateway.tools.allow) as high-risk and audit such configurations carefully.

Credits

OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting this issue and contributing remediation work.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T23:32:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nOpenClaw Gateway exposes an authenticated HTTP endpoint (`POST /tools/invoke`) intended for invoking a constrained set of tools. Two issues could combine to significantly increase blast radius in misconfigured or exposed deployments:\n\n- The HTTP gateway layer did not deny high-risk session orchestration tools by default, allowing a caller with Gateway auth to invoke tools like `sessions_spawn` / `sessions_send` and pivot into creating or controlling agent sessions.\n- ACP clients could auto-approve permission requests for risky tools with insufficient user interaction/guardrails, reducing the friction that should normally prevent silent execution or mutation.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the Gateway is reachable by an attacker and they obtain a valid Gateway token, they may be able to:\n\n- Escalate from single-tool invocation to spawning/controlling sessions and reach command execution capabilities depending on tool policy and runtime environment.\n- Perform cross-session message injection via `sessions_send`.\n- In ACP-integrated scenarios, obtain unintended approvals for non-read/search tool permissions.\n\n## CVSS\n\n- `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` (8.8)\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `openclaw \u003c 2026.2.14`\n\n## Fixed in\n\n- `openclaw \u003e= 2026.2.14`\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe default behavior is now hardened:\n\n- PR #15390: deny high-risk tools over HTTP `/tools/invoke` by default (with `gateway.tools.{allow,deny}` overrides) and harden ACP permission handling.\n- Commit `bb1c3dfe1`: ACP clients now prompt for any non-read/search permission request (fail closed for mutating/execution/fetch operations).\n- Commit `539689a2f`: security audit warns when `gateway.tools.allow` re-enables default-denied HTTP tools, since this can increase RCE blast radius if the Gateway is reachable.\n- Commit `153a7644e`: ACP safe-kind inference is stricter to avoid accidental auto-approval due to substring matches (still auto-approves only confident `read/search`).\n\n## Mitigations / deployment guidance\n\n- Keep the Gateway loopback-only unless you have a strong reason not to: `gateway.bind=\"loopback\"` / `openclaw gateway run --bind loopback`.\n- Avoid exposing the Gateway directly to the public internet. Use an SSH tunnel or Tailscale to access a loopback-bound Gateway.\n- Treat opting in to default-denied HTTP tools (via `gateway.tools.allow`) as high-risk and audit such configurations carefully.\n\n## Credits\n\nOpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting this issue and contributing remediation work.",
  "id": "GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh",
  "modified": "2026-03-02T23:32:22Z",
  "published": "2026-03-02T23:32:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/15390"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/153a7644e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/539689a2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/bb1c3dfe1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ee31cd47b49f4b2f128a69a2a3745ca9db68b3be"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval"
}


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