{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T19:54:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nSandboxed requester sessions could reach host-side ACP session initialization through `/acp spawn`.\n\nOpenClaw already blocked `sessions_spawn({ runtime: \"acp\" })` from sandboxed sessions, but the slash-command path initialized ACP directly without applying the same host-runtime guard first.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- npm package: `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched version: `\u003e= 2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nACP sessions run on the host, not inside the OpenClaw sandbox. The direct ACP spawn path in `src/agents/acp-spawn.ts` already denied sandboxed requesters, but `/acp spawn` in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts` called `initializeSession(...)` without first applying the same restriction.\n\nIn affected versions, an already authorized sender in a sandboxed session could use `/acp spawn` to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP runtime initialization when ACP was enabled and a backend was available.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3`\n\n### Fix Details\nThe fix introduced a shared ACP runtime-policy guard in `src/agents/acp-spawn.ts` and reused it from the `/acp spawn` handler in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts` before any ACP backend initialization. Regression coverage was added in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp.test.ts` to prove sandboxed `/acp spawn` requests are rejected early, while existing ACP spawn behavior for non-sandboxed sessions remains unchanged.\n\n### Release Process Note\nPatched version is pre-set to `2026.3.7` so the advisory can be published once that npm release is available.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-9q36-67vc-rrwg",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T19:54:54Z",
  "published": "2026-03-09T19:54:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-9q36-67vc-rrwg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Sandboxed /acp spawn requests could initialize host ACP sessions"
}