GHSA-MPMW-F6H6-3G26

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:44 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:44
VLAI
Summary
Winter: My Account preview exposes another backend user's profile by record ID
Details

Impact

Backend\Controllers\MyAccount, introduced in v1.2.13, declares an empty $requiredPermissions array so that any authenticated backend user can manage their own account. It implements the FormController behavior, which exposes three routable actions — create, update and preview — that each take a record id from the URL.

index() passes the authenticated user's own id to the behavior, but the inherited actions were left routable and formFindModelObject() was not scoped, so a caller-supplied id resolved against an unscoped Backend\Models\User query:

GET /backend/backend/myaccount/preview/{other_user_id}

preview disclosed the target user's first name, last name, login, email address and avatar; update was equally routable and additionally disclosed role, group membership, superuser flag and throttle state. Password controls render a mask, so no credential material was exposed. Backend user ids are sequential and trivially enumerated, and as these are GET actions no CSRF token is involved.

The behavior's AJAX handlers (create_onSave, update_onSave, update_onDelete) were also dispatchable on these routes, but cross-user writes were blocked by the Backend\Models\User authorization guards added in v1.2.13. The confirmed impact is unauthorized disclosure of backend user profile data.

To actively exploit this security issue, an attacker would need access to the Backend with a user account with any level of access.

Patches

MyAccount no longer exposes the generic record actions it never used as routes, and its form lookup is now pinned to the authenticated user:

  • protected $guarded = ['create', 'update', 'preview']; removes the inherited actions from routing. The guard has to be at the routing layer, as handler dispatch ({action}_{handler}) runs before the page action.
  • formExtendQuery() constrains every lookup made by the behavior to the current user's key.

This security issue has been fixed as of v1.2.14 (commit cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb).

Workarounds

There is no supported workaround other than upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, you may apply the fix manually in modules/backend/controllers/MyAccount.php:

  1. Add protected $guarded = ['create', 'update', 'preview']; to the controller.
  2. Add a formExtendQuery() method that scopes the lookup to the current user:
public function formExtendQuery(\Winter\Storm\Database\Builder $query): void
{
    $query->whereKey($this->user->getKey());
}

References

  • https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-j5jq-cr68-v2xx
  • https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb

Credit to Awwader (@NRAwwad) for reporting the issue.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Email us at hello@wintercms.com

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "winter/wn-backend-module"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.13"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.2.13"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:44:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`Backend\\Controllers\\MyAccount`, introduced in v1.2.13, declares an empty `$requiredPermissions` array so that any authenticated backend user can manage their own account. It implements the `FormController` behavior, which exposes three routable actions \u2014 `create`, `update` and `preview` \u2014 that each take a record id from the URL.\n\n`index()` passes the authenticated user\u0027s own id to the behavior, but the inherited actions were left routable and `formFindModelObject()` was not scoped, so a caller-supplied id resolved against an unscoped `Backend\\Models\\User` query:\n\n```\nGET /backend/backend/myaccount/preview/{other_user_id}\n```\n\n`preview` disclosed the target user\u0027s first name, last name, login, email address and avatar; `update` was equally routable and additionally disclosed role, group membership, superuser flag and throttle state. Password controls render a mask, so no credential material was exposed. Backend user ids are sequential and trivially enumerated, and as these are `GET` actions no CSRF token is involved.\n\nThe behavior\u0027s AJAX handlers (`create_onSave`, `update_onSave`, `update_onDelete`) were also dispatchable on these routes, but cross-user writes were blocked by the `Backend\\Models\\User` authorization guards added in v1.2.13. The confirmed impact is unauthorized disclosure of backend user profile data.\n\nTo actively exploit this security issue, an attacker would need access to the Backend with a user account with any level of access.\n\n### Patches\n\n`MyAccount` no longer exposes the generic record actions it never used as routes, and its form lookup is now pinned to the authenticated user:\n\n- `protected $guarded = [\u0027create\u0027, \u0027update\u0027, \u0027preview\u0027];` removes the inherited actions from routing. The guard has to be at the routing layer, as handler dispatch (`{action}_{handler}`) runs before the page action.\n- `formExtendQuery()` constrains every lookup made by the behavior to the current user\u0027s key.\n\nThis security issue has been fixed as of **v1.2.14** (commit [`cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb`](https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb)).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no supported workaround other than upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, you may apply the fix manually in `modules/backend/controllers/MyAccount.php`:\n\n1. Add `protected $guarded = [\u0027create\u0027, \u0027update\u0027, \u0027preview\u0027];` to the controller.\n2. Add a `formExtendQuery()` method that scopes the lookup to the current user:\n\n```php\npublic function formExtendQuery(\\Winter\\Storm\\Database\\Builder $query): void\n{\n    $query-\u003ewhereKey($this-\u003euser-\u003egetKey());\n}\n```\n\n### References\n\n- https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-j5jq-cr68-v2xx\n- https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb\n\n\nCredit to Awwader ([@NRAwwad](https://github.com/NRAwwad)) for reporting the issue.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n- Email us at [hello@wintercms.com](mailto:hello@wintercms.com)",
  "id": "GHSA-mpmw-f6h6-3g26",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T18:44:45Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T18:44:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-mpmw-f6h6-3g26"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/releases/tag/v1.2.14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Winter: My Account preview exposes another backend user\u0027s profile by record ID"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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