GHSA-RM43-82J9-R4MJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-13 14:17 – Updated: 2026-08-13 14:17The optional dashboard HTTP server (atomic_agents/dashboard/serve.py) builds filesystem paths directly from the request path and serves them without a containment check. It is the only per-request untrusted-path site in the codebase that does not route through _io.safe_resolve_under. Literal ../ segments survive urlparse and Path joining, so a request can read files outside the intended agents_root (including via the static branch).
Impact: arbitrary file read. The default bind is loopback, but --host is an operator-settable documented flag; binding 0.0.0.0 exposes this to the LAN. Even on loopback it is reachable via DNS-rebinding from a browser or SSRF from a co-located service.
Affected: dashboard/serve.py (DashboardHandler.do_GET / _serve_file), all versions through 1.0.0.
Fix: route every served path through _io.safe_resolve_under against the intended root and return 404 on PathTraversalError; reject ../separators early; optionally refuse a non-loopback --host unless an explicit auth/allow flag is set (matching serve/_app.py).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "atomic-agents-stack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-13T14:17:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The optional dashboard HTTP server (`atomic_agents/dashboard/serve.py`) builds filesystem paths directly from the request path and serves them without a containment check. It is the only per-request untrusted-path site in the codebase that does not route through `_io.safe_resolve_under`. Literal `../` segments survive `urlparse` and `Path` joining, so a request can read files outside the intended `agents_root` (including via the static branch).\n\n**Impact:** arbitrary file read. The default bind is loopback, but `--host` is an operator-settable documented flag; binding `0.0.0.0` exposes this to the LAN. Even on loopback it is reachable via DNS-rebinding from a browser or SSRF from a co-located service.\n\n**Affected:** `dashboard/serve.py` (`DashboardHandler.do_GET` / `_serve_file`), all versions through 1.0.0.\n\n**Fix:** route every served path through `_io.safe_resolve_under` against the intended root and return 404 on `PathTraversalError`; reject `..`/separators early; optionally refuse a non-loopback `--host` unless an explicit auth/allow flag is set (matching `serve/_app.py`).",
"id": "GHSA-rm43-82j9-r4mj",
"modified": "2026-08-13T14:17:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T14:17:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dep0we/atomic-agents-stack/security/advisories/GHSA-rm43-82j9-r4mj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dep0we/atomic-agents-stack/commit/ec474f458122c5c0ca718d0df3078c8080338b2c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dep0we/atomic-agents-stack"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "atomic-agents-stack: Dashboard HTTP server path traversal allows arbitrary file read"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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