GHSA-RWJ8-P9VQ-25GV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 17:44 – Updated: 2026-03-05 22:00Summary
The BlueBubbles extension accepted attacker-controlled local filesystem paths via mediaPath and could read arbitrary local files from disk before sending them as media attachments.
Details
When sendBlueBubblesMedia received a non-HTTP media source, the previous implementation resolved it to a local path and read it directly from disk. There was no required allowlist of safe directories, so values like /etc/passwd (or equivalent sensitive paths on other platforms) could be requested and exfiltrated.
The fix hardens local media loading by requiring explicit configured roots (channels.bluebubbles.mediaLocalRoots) and by enforcing canonical-path containment checks before reading local files. Paths outside allowed roots are rejected.
Fix PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16322 Fix commit: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
< v2026.2.14 - Fixed:
>= v2026.2.14(planned)
Impact
An attacker able to trigger BlueBubbles media sends could exfiltrate local files accessible to the OpenClaw process.
Remediation
Upgrade to a release that includes commit 71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc and configure channels.bluebubbles.mediaLocalRoots to explicit trusted directories.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T17:44:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe BlueBubbles extension accepted attacker-controlled local filesystem paths via `mediaPath` and could read arbitrary local files from disk before sending them as media attachments.\n\n### Details\nWhen `sendBlueBubblesMedia` received a non-HTTP media source, the previous implementation resolved it to a local path and read it directly from disk. There was no required allowlist of safe directories, so values like `/etc/passwd` (or equivalent sensitive paths on other platforms) could be requested and exfiltrated.\n\nThe fix hardens local media loading by requiring explicit configured roots (`channels.bluebubbles.mediaLocalRoots`) and by enforcing canonical-path containment checks before reading local files. Paths outside allowed roots are rejected.\n\nFix PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16322\nFix commit: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c v2026.2.14`\n- Fixed: `\u003e= v2026.2.14` (planned)\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker able to trigger BlueBubbles media sends could exfiltrate local files accessible to the OpenClaw process.\n\n### Remediation\nUpgrade to a release that includes commit `71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc` and configure `channels.bluebubbles.mediaLocalRoots` to explicit trusted directories.",
"id": "GHSA-rwj8-p9vq-25gv",
"modified": "2026-03-05T22:00:36Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T17:44:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-p9vq-25gv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a LFI in BlueBubbles media path handling"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.