GHSA-J659-8XH6-5PQ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 21:50 – Updated: 2026-08-17 21:50_estimate_batch_cost (atomic_agents/agent.py) looks up the per-model output price with PRICING.get(model, {}), returning 0.0 for any model not in the hardcoded pricing table. _check_batch_reservation then early-returns when the reservation is <= 0, skipping the batch reservation entirely. That reservation is the only defense against the documented fan-out race where every parallel helper/delegate reads the identical pre-batch on-disk cost total and each passes its individual check even though the collective spend overruns the configured cap.
Impact: an operator running any model not in the pricing table (self-hosted/Ollama/vLLM, a new provider SKU) with cost_guardrails + daily_cap_usd set believes the cap protects them, but a single parallel batch can blow past the cap. The parallel-helper model argument can also be steered to an unknown id. The sibling dream._estimate_dream_cost does this correctly (PRICING.get(model, _fallback_pricing())), which makes this a clear defect.
Affected: agent.py (_estimate_batch_cost / _check_batch_reservation), all versions through 1.0.0.
Fix: use PRICING.get(model, _costs._fallback_pricing())['output'] (mirror dream/calc_cost). Add a conformance test asserting an unknown-model batch reserves > 0 and that an over-cap unknown-model batch raises CostGuardrailBlocked.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "atomic-agents-stack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T21:50:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "`_estimate_batch_cost` (`atomic_agents/agent.py`) looks up the per-model output price with `PRICING.get(model, {})`, returning 0.0 for any model not in the hardcoded pricing table. `_check_batch_reservation` then early-returns when the reservation is \u003c= 0, skipping the batch reservation entirely. That reservation is the only defense against the documented fan-out race where every parallel helper/delegate reads the identical pre-batch on-disk cost total and each passes its individual check even though the collective spend overruns the configured cap.\n\n**Impact:** an operator running any model not in the pricing table (self-hosted/Ollama/vLLM, a new provider SKU) with `cost_guardrails` + `daily_cap_usd` set believes the cap protects them, but a single parallel batch can blow past the cap. The parallel-helper `model` argument can also be steered to an unknown id. The sibling `dream._estimate_dream_cost` does this correctly (`PRICING.get(model, _fallback_pricing())`), which makes this a clear defect.\n\n**Affected:** `agent.py` (`_estimate_batch_cost` / `_check_batch_reservation`), all versions through 1.0.0.\n\n**Fix:** use `PRICING.get(model, _costs._fallback_pricing())[\u0027output\u0027]` (mirror dream/calc_cost). Add a conformance test asserting an unknown-model batch reserves \u003e 0 and that an over-cap unknown-model batch raises `CostGuardrailBlocked`.",
"id": "GHSA-j659-8xh6-5pq5",
"modified": "2026-08-17T21:50:01Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T21:50:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dep0we/atomic-agents-stack/security/advisories/GHSA-j659-8xh6-5pq5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dep0we/atomic-agents-stack"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dep0we/atomic-agents-stack/releases#release-v1.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "atomic-agents-stack: Parallel helper/delegate batch reserves $0 for models absent from the pricing table, bypassing the cost-cap fan-out guard"
}
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