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GHSA-M6C8-JCW2-5R25

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-18 13:11 – Updated: 2026-09-18 13:12
VLAI
Summary
Opencast: Stored XSS in Paella player via WebVTT/DFXP caption cue text
Details

Summary

The Opencast Paella player renders caption cue text into innerHTML without escaping. The captions canvas clears _captionsContainer.innerHTML and then appends each active cue with _captionsContainer.innerHTML += cue, so HTML inside a WebVTT or DFXP cue becomes live DOM and executes in the Opencast origin.

The caption track is read from any media package element with a captions/* flavor and is served, with the player manifest, to anonymous viewers through /search/episode.json. The caption plugins that consume it are enabled in the default player configuration, the "Subtitles" upload that produces a captions/source track is active by default, and no caption processing step escapes the cue text.

A user who can upload a subtitle to an event and publish it stores the payload in the published caption file. Any viewer who opens the event and turns captions on runs the script.

Result: a non-admin content author stores JavaScript in a subtitle cue that executes in the browser session of every viewer who enables captions on that event, including anonymous viewers and authenticated staff.

Affected

opencast/opencast, engage-paella-player module. Supported release lines 19.x and 20.x are affected (and 18.x). Live-confirmed on 18.8 (Paella 7, paella-core 1.50.2) and 20.0 (Paella 8, paella-core 1.50.4); 19.5 ships the code-identical caption path (paella-core 1.50.4, same EpisodeConversor and default plugin config as 20.0). The captions canvas uses the same innerHTML += cue sink across these versions. Default configuration: the WebVTT and DFXP caption plugins are enabled: true in etc/ui-config/mh_default_org/paella7/config.json, the "Subtitles" upload option (captions/source, .vtt) is active in etc/listproviders/event.upload.asset.options.properties, and the fast workflow publishes captions/* to the engage player. Condition: an event with a caption track published to the engage player. No non-default flag required.

Root cause

The captions canvas appends each cue to _captionsContainer.innerHTML in the bundled paella-core (served at /paellaN/ui/paella-player.js / the 20.x core chunk), so markup in a cue becomes live DOM. The caption entry is built from any media package element whose flavor matches captions/* at modules/engage-paella-player-7/src/js/EpisodeConversor.js:392, and /search/episode.json serves the manifest and the caption file to anonymous clients. The WebVTT and DFXP plugins that consume it are enabled by default at etc/ui-config/mh_default_org/paella7/config.json:571 and :574. The cue text is not HTML-escaped before assignment to innerHTML, and partial-process-uploaded-captions only cuts and tags the file, it never sanitizes it. Opencast sets neither a Content-Security-Policy nor an X-Content-Type-Options header, so the injected script runs without restriction.

Reproduction

Default config, default caption plugins enabled, a non-admin user with ROLE_API_EVENTS_CREATE, ROLE_API_EVENTS_TRACK_EDIT, and ROLE_UI_TASKS_CREATE (no ROLE_ADMIN).

  1. As the non-admin user, create an event, then upload a WebVTT subtitle as captions/source whose cue text is an XSS payload, and publish the event.
WEBVTT

00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:30.000
<img src=x onerror=document.title=window.__xss=document.domain>
  1. The anonymous search manifest then exposes the caption and serves the cue raw.
GET /search/episode.json?id=<event>
"type":"captions/source", "url":".../static/.../x.vtt"
GET .../static/.../x.vtt  ->  cue text returned verbatim
  1. Open the event in the player as an anonymous viewer, open the captions menu, and select the track; the cue is written to innerHTML and the onerror handler runs.

Live-verified: on Opencast 18.8 (build 8705223) in Chrome, a non-admin author published the subtitle and an anonymous viewer enabled captions, rendering the cue as a live <img> node and setting window.__xss and document.title to document.domain. On Opencast 20.0 (build d919405, Paella 8), the served core bundle contains the identical innerHTML += cue sink and the player loads the cue raw; the sink executes JavaScript in the engage origin when fed the player's own published caption file.

Impact

  • JavaScript execution in the Opencast origin in the session of any viewer who enables captions on the event.
  • Anonymous viewers and authenticated staff are equally affected; an instructor or admin viewer exposes that session context to the script.
  • Session and CSRF-token theft, actions performed as the victim against the Opencast REST API.
  • Stored by a non-admin content author, triggered by viewing with captions on, no attacker authentication at view time.

Credit

Jan Kahmen, turingpoint (jan@turingpoint.de)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.opencastproject:opencast-engage-paella-player-7"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "19.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.opencastproject:opencast-engage-paella-player-7"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "20.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "paella-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.50.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77615"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-18T13:11:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T21:17:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Opencast Paella player renders caption cue text into `innerHTML` without escaping. The captions canvas clears `_captionsContainer.innerHTML` and then appends each active cue with `_captionsContainer.innerHTML += cue`, so HTML inside a WebVTT or DFXP cue becomes live DOM and executes in the Opencast origin.\n\nThe caption track is read from any media package element with a `captions/*` flavor and is served, with the player manifest, to anonymous viewers through `/search/episode.json`. The caption plugins that consume it are enabled in the default player configuration, the \"Subtitles\" upload that produces a `captions/source` track is active by default, and no caption processing step escapes the cue text.\n\nA user who can upload a subtitle to an event and publish it stores the payload in the published caption file. Any viewer who opens the event and turns captions on runs the script.\n\nResult: a non-admin content author stores JavaScript in a subtitle cue that executes in the browser session of every viewer who enables captions on that event, including anonymous viewers and authenticated staff.\n\n## Affected\n\nopencast/opencast, `engage-paella-player` module. Supported release lines 19.x and 20.x are affected (and 18.x). Live-confirmed on 18.8 (Paella 7, paella-core 1.50.2) and 20.0 (Paella 8, paella-core 1.50.4); 19.5 ships the code-identical caption path (paella-core 1.50.4, same `EpisodeConversor` and default plugin config as 20.0). The captions canvas uses the same `innerHTML += cue` sink across these versions.\nDefault configuration: the WebVTT and DFXP caption plugins are `enabled: true` in `etc/ui-config/mh_default_org/paella7/config.json`, the \"Subtitles\" upload option (`captions/source`, `.vtt`) is active in `etc/listproviders/event.upload.asset.options.properties`, and the `fast` workflow publishes `captions/*` to the engage player.\nCondition: an event with a caption track published to the engage player. No non-default flag required.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe captions canvas appends each cue to `_captionsContainer.innerHTML` in the bundled paella-core (served at `/paellaN/ui/paella-player.js` / the 20.x core chunk), so markup in a cue becomes live DOM. The caption entry is built from any media package element whose flavor matches `captions/*` at `modules/engage-paella-player-7/src/js/EpisodeConversor.js:392`, and `/search/episode.json` serves the manifest and the caption file to anonymous clients. The WebVTT and DFXP plugins that consume it are enabled by default at `etc/ui-config/mh_default_org/paella7/config.json:571` and `:574`. The cue text is not HTML-escaped before assignment to `innerHTML`, and `partial-process-uploaded-captions` only cuts and tags the file, it never sanitizes it. Opencast sets neither a Content-Security-Policy nor an X-Content-Type-Options header, so the injected script runs without restriction.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nDefault config, default caption plugins enabled, a non-admin user with `ROLE_API_EVENTS_CREATE`, `ROLE_API_EVENTS_TRACK_EDIT`, and `ROLE_UI_TASKS_CREATE` (no `ROLE_ADMIN`).\n\n1. As the non-admin user, create an event, then upload a WebVTT subtitle as `captions/source` whose cue text is an XSS payload, and publish the event.\n\n```\nWEBVTT\n\n00:00:00.000 --\u003e 00:00:30.000\n\u003cimg src=x onerror=document.title=window.__xss=document.domain\u003e\n```\n\n2. The anonymous search manifest then exposes the caption and serves the cue raw.\n\n```\nGET /search/episode.json?id=\u003cevent\u003e\n\"type\":\"captions/source\", \"url\":\".../static/.../x.vtt\"\nGET .../static/.../x.vtt  -\u003e  cue text returned verbatim\n```\n\n3. Open the event in the player as an anonymous viewer, open the captions menu, and select the track; the cue is written to `innerHTML` and the `onerror` handler runs.\n\nLive-verified: on Opencast 18.8 (build 8705223) in Chrome, a non-admin author published the subtitle and an anonymous viewer enabled captions, rendering the cue as a live `\u003cimg\u003e` node and setting `window.__xss` and `document.title` to `document.domain`. On Opencast 20.0 (build d919405, Paella 8), the served core bundle contains the identical `innerHTML += cue` sink and the player loads the cue raw; the sink executes JavaScript in the engage origin when fed the player\u0027s own published caption file.\n\n## Impact\n\n- JavaScript execution in the Opencast origin in the session of any viewer who enables captions on the event.\n- Anonymous viewers and authenticated staff are equally affected; an instructor or admin viewer exposes that session context to the script.\n- Session and CSRF-token theft, actions performed as the victim against the Opencast REST API.\n- Stored by a non-admin content author, triggered by viewing with captions on, no attacker authentication at view time.\n\n## Credit\n\nJan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://www.turingpoint.de) (jan@turingpoint.de)",
  "id": "GHSA-m6c8-jcw2-5r25",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T13:12:00Z",
  "published": "2026-09-18T13:11:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/security/advisories/GHSA-m6c8-jcw2-5r25"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/pull/7736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/commit/701682c635f668228c3e8fb7b4564b3294788e40"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/polimediaupv/paella-core/commit/94a36490808ac5a1f60a0745d71ec9253f6d206b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/polimediaupv/paella-core/commit/9b2f14ec4cf55efaf4c045c77a5ed8f5ec559ab4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/polimediaupv/paella-player/commit/6fe4af7306044198c8e91e2e7f4128428b83cf03"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/releases/tag/19.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/releases/tag/20.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/polimediaupv/paella-player/blob/a1b6c42467938a00a4b4d0b8c68435cd4f9d2a16/repos/paella-core/CHANGELOG.md?plain=1#L21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Opencast: Stored XSS in Paella player via WebVTT/DFXP caption cue text"
}



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