GHSA-QHHJ-7HRC-GQJ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-26 21:46 – Updated: 2024-09-20 21:11Part of the Cure53 security audit of Home Assistant.
The audit team’s analyses confirmed that the redirect_uri and client_id are alterable when logging in. Consequently, the code parameter utilized to fetch the access_token post-authentication will be sent to the URL specified in the aforementioned parameters.
Since an arbitrary URL is permitted and homeassistant.local represents the preferred, default domain likely used and trusted by many users, an attacker could leverage this weakness to manipulate a user and retrieve account access. Notably, this attack strategy is plausible if the victim has exposed their Home Assistant to the Internet, since after acquiring the victim’s access_token, the adversary would need to utilize it directly towards the instance to achieve any pertinent malicious actions.
To achieve this compromise attempt, the attacker must send a link with a redirect_uri that they control to the victim’s own Home Assistant instance. In the eventuality the victim authenticates via the said link, the attacker would obtain code sent to the specified URL in redirect_uri, which can then be leveraged to fetch an access_token.
An attacker could increase the efficacy of this strategy by registering a nearly identical domain to homeassistant.local, which at first glance may appear legitimate and thereby obfuscate any malicious intentions.
Nonetheless, owing to the requirements for victim interaction and Home Assistant instance exposure to the Internet, this severity rating was consequently downgraded to Low.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "homeassistant"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2023.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41893"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-26T21:46:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-20T00:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "[_Part of the Cure53 security audit of Home Assistant._](https://www.home-assistant.io/blog/2023/10/19/security-audits-of-home-assistant/)\n\nThe audit team\u2019s analyses confirmed that the `redirect_uri` and `client_id` are alterable when logging in. Consequently, the code parameter utilized to fetch the `access_token` post-authentication will be sent to the URL specified in the aforementioned parameters.\n\nSince an arbitrary URL is permitted and `homeassistant.local` represents the preferred, default domain likely used and trusted by many users, an attacker could leverage this weakness to manipulate a user and retrieve account access. Notably, this attack strategy is plausible if the victim has exposed their Home Assistant to the Internet, since after acquiring the victim\u2019s `access_token`, the adversary would need to utilize it directly towards the instance to achieve any pertinent malicious actions.\n\nTo achieve this compromise attempt, the attacker must send a link with a `redirect_uri` that they control to the victim\u2019s own Home Assistant instance. In the eventuality the victim authenticates via the said link, the attacker would obtain code sent to the specified URL in `redirect_uri`, which can then be leveraged to fetch an `access_token`.\n\nAn attacker could increase the efficacy of this strategy by registering a nearly identical domain to `homeassistant.local`, which at first glance may appear legitimate and thereby obfuscate any malicious intentions.\n\nNonetheless, owing to the requirements for victim interaction and Home Assistant instance exposure to the Internet, this severity rating was consequently downgraded to Low.",
"id": "GHSA-qhhj-7hrc-gqj5",
"modified": "2024-09-20T21:11:07Z",
"published": "2023-10-26T21:46:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-qhhj-7hrc-gqj5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41893"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/homeassistant/PYSEC-2023-214.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.home-assistant.io/blog/2023/10/19/security-audits-of-home-assistant"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Home Assistant vulnerable to account takeover via auth_callback login"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.