GHSA-R5FQ-947M-XM57
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 20:45 – Updated: 2026-02-19 20:45Summary
In affected versions, when apply_patch was enabled and the agent ran without filesystem sandbox containment, crafted paths could cause file writes/deletes outside the configured workspace directory.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.2.13 - Fixed:
>= 2026.2.14
Details
The non-sandbox path resolution in apply_patch did not enforce workspace containment. Inputs like ../../... or absolute paths could escape the working directory in non-sandboxed mode.
Impact
Practical impact depends on deployment and who can trigger tool execution. This is most relevant when tool invocation is exposed to less-trusted callers or when operators expected workspace-only containment.
Workarounds
- Keep
tools.exec.applyPatch.enableddisabled if you do not needapply_patch. - Keep
tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnlyat its secure default oftrue. - Restrict who can trigger tool execution (and which tools are allowlisted).
Configuration Note
tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false intentionally opts out of workspace containment and can re-enable outside-workspace writes/deletes.
Fix
- PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405
- Merge commit:
5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1
Credits
Thanks to @p80n-sec for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T20:45:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn affected versions, when `apply_patch` was enabled and the agent ran without filesystem sandbox containment, crafted paths could cause file writes/deletes outside the configured workspace directory.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.13`\n- Fixed: `\u003e= 2026.2.14`\n\n## Details\n\nThe non-sandbox path resolution in `apply_patch` did not enforce workspace containment. Inputs like `../../...` or absolute paths could escape the working directory in non-sandboxed mode.\n\n## Impact\n\nPractical impact depends on deployment and who can trigger tool execution. This is most relevant when tool invocation is exposed to less-trusted callers or when operators expected workspace-only containment.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled` disabled if you do not need `apply_patch`.\n- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly` at its secure default of `true`.\n- Restrict who can trigger tool execution (and which tools are allowlisted).\n\n## Configuration Note\n\n`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` intentionally opts out of workspace containment and can re-enable outside-workspace writes/deletes.\n\n## Fix\n\n- PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405\n- Merge commit: `5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1`\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks to @p80n-sec for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-r5fq-947m-xm57",
"modified": "2026-02-19T20:45:58Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T20:45:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-r5fq-947m-xm57"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a path traversal in apply_patch could write/delete files outside the workspace"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.