GHSA-WGPJ-7C2J-VFJM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-04-08 16:33 – Updated: 2024-09-23 16:09Impact
An external audit of the Indico codebase has discovered a vulnerability in Indico's URL generation logic which could have allowed an attacker to make Indico send a password reset link with a valid token pointing to an attacker-controlled domain by sending that domain in the Host header. Had a user clicked such a link without realizing it does not point to Indico (and that they never requested it), it would have revealed their password reset token to the attacker, allowing them to reset the password for that user and thus take over their Indico account.
- If the web server already enforces a canonical host name, this cannot be exploited (this was not part of the default config from the Indico setup guide)
- If only SSO is used (
LOCAL_IDENTITIESset toFalse), the vulnerability cannot be exploited for password reset links, but other links in emails set by Indico could be tampered with in the same way (with less problematic impact though)
Patches
You need to update to Indico 2.3.4 as soon as possible. See the docs for instructions on how to update.
Workarounds
You can configure the web server to canonicalize the URL to the hostname used for Indico. See this commit for the changes in our setup docs; they can be easily applied to your existing web server config.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open a thread in our forum
- Email us privately at indico-team@cern.ch
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "indico"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-30185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-640"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-08T16:33:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-07T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAn external audit of the Indico codebase has discovered a vulnerability in Indico\u0027s URL generation logic which could have allowed an attacker to make Indico send a password reset link with a valid token pointing to an attacker-controlled domain by sending that domain in the `Host` header. Had a user clicked such a link without realizing it does not point to Indico (and that they never requested it), it would have revealed their password reset token to the attacker, allowing them to reset the password for that user and thus take over their Indico account.\n\n- If the web server already enforces a canonical host name, this cannot be exploited (this was not part of the default config from the Indico setup guide)\n- If only SSO is used ([`LOCAL_IDENTITIES`](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/config/settings/#LOCAL_IDENTITIES) set to `False`), the vulnerability cannot be exploited for password reset links, but other links in emails set by Indico could be tampered with in the same way (with less problematic impact though)\n\n### Patches\nYou need to update to [Indico 2.3.4](https://github.com/indico/indico/releases/tag/v2.3.4) as soon as possible.\nSee [the docs](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/installation/upgrade/) for instructions on how to update.\n\n### Workarounds\nYou can configure the web server to canonicalize the URL to the hostname used for Indico. See [this commit](https://github.com/indico/indico/pull/4815/commits/b6bff6d004abcf07db1891e26a0eb4aa0edb7c21) for the changes in our setup docs; they can be easily applied to your existing web server config.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Open a thread in [our forum](https://talk.getindico.io/)\n- Email us privately at indico-team@cern.ch",
"id": "GHSA-wgpj-7c2j-vfjm",
"modified": "2024-09-23T16:09:57Z",
"published": "2021-04-08T16:33:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indico/indico/security/advisories/GHSA-wgpj-7c2j-vfjm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30185"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wgpj-7c2j-vfjm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indico/indico/releases/tag/v2.3.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/indico/PYSEC-2021-18.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.shorebreaksecurity.com/blog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Indico Tampering with links (e.g. password reset) in sent emails"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.