GHSA-XVX8-77M6-GWG6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 15:47 – Updated: 2026-04-06 22:45
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Sandbox `writeFile` commit could race outside the validated path
Details

Summary

In affected versions of openclaw, the sandbox fs-bridge writeFile commit step used an unanchored container path during the final move into place. An attacker racing parent-path changes inside the sandbox could redirect the committed file outside the validated sandbox path.

Impact

This is a sandbox boundary bypass. In-sandbox code could win a time-of-check-time-of-use race and cause host-approved writeFile operations to land outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.

Affected Packages and Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: < 2026.3.11
  • Fixed in: 2026.3.11

Technical Details

The hardening work for anchored remove, rename, and mkdir operations did not fully cover the writeFile commit path. The final mv still used the raw target path, leaving a race window between safety revalidation and the in-container commit step.

Fix

OpenClaw now anchors the writeFile commit path to the canonical parent directory before the final move. The fix shipped in openclaw@2026.3.11.

Workarounds

Upgrade to 2026.3.11 or later.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32977"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T15:47:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nIn affected versions of `openclaw`, the sandbox fs-bridge `writeFile` commit step used an unanchored container path during the final move into place. An attacker racing parent-path changes inside the sandbox could redirect the committed file outside the validated sandbox path.\n\n## Impact\nThis is a sandbox boundary bypass. In-sandbox code could win a time-of-check-time-of-use race and cause host-approved `writeFile` operations to land outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.\n\n## Affected Packages and Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c 2026.3.11`\n- Fixed in: `2026.3.11`\n\n## Technical Details\nThe hardening work for anchored remove, rename, and mkdir operations did not fully cover the `writeFile` commit path. The final `mv` still used the raw target path, leaving a race window between safety revalidation and the in-container commit step.\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw now anchors the `writeFile` commit path to the canonical parent directory before the final move. The fix shipped in `openclaw@2026.3.11`.\n\n## Workarounds\nUpgrade to `2026.3.11` or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-xvx8-77m6-gwg6",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T22:45:32Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T15:47:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xvx8-77m6-gwg6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32977"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-sandbox-boundary-bypass-via-unanchored-writefile-commit-path"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Sandbox `writeFile` commit could race outside the validated path"
}



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