JLSEC-2026-1388
Vulnerability from osv_julia – Published: 2026-11-16 13:05 – Updated: 2026-11-19 22:32 – Source websiteDescription
Reseau.TLS.Config keeps the server's session-ticket keys and the client's cached TLS sessions in private fields.
These fields arrived with Reseau's native TLS stack in 1.1.0. Before 1.7.0, Config had no show method that left
them out, so show, print, repr, string and string interpolation of a config that had handled connections
printed the ticket keys' secret bytes and the cached sessions' secrets.
Reseau 1.7.0 prints only a config's public settings, and masks key_passphrase. Base.dump still prints every
field of any value.
Impact
An application that prints or logs a TLS.Config after it has handled connections writes these secrets to that
output. Anyone who can read the output can:
- Decrypt the session tickets that a server issued while the printed ticket keys were in use. A TLS 1.2 ticket carries the session's master secret, which decrypts recorded traffic of that session and of its resumptions. A TLS 1.3 ticket carries a resumption key that lets them resume the session as the client.
- Use a client's cached TLS 1.2 session secrets to decrypt recorded traffic of those sessions, and its TLS 1.3 resumption keys to resume those sessions as the client.
Reseau resumes TLS 1.3 sessions only with a new key exchange (psk_dhe_ke), so a TLS 1.3 secret does not decrypt
recorded traffic. Session tickets are on by default.
Patches
Fixed in Reseau 1.7.0. Upgrade to 1.7.0 or later.
Workarounds
Don't print or log a TLS.Config, or any value that contains one, on an affected version. Setting
session_tickets_disabled = true stops a server from issuing tickets. Reseau generates ticket keys at random and keeps
them only in memory, so restarting a process that may have logged a config discards its ticket keys and cached
sessions. Treat logs that may contain a printed config as holding secrets.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Julia",
"name": "Reseau",
"purl": "pkg:julia/Reseau?uuid=802f3686-a58f-41ce-bb0c-3c43c75bba36"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC-BY-4.0"
},
"details": "### Description\n\n`Reseau.TLS.Config` keeps the server\u0027s session-ticket keys and the client\u0027s cached TLS sessions in private fields.\nThese fields arrived with Reseau\u0027s native TLS stack in 1.1.0. Before 1.7.0, `Config` had no `show` method that left\nthem out, so `show`, `print`, `repr`, `string` and string interpolation of a config that had handled connections\nprinted the ticket keys\u0027 secret bytes and the cached sessions\u0027 secrets.\n\nReseau 1.7.0 prints only a config\u0027s public settings, and masks `key_passphrase`. `Base.dump` still prints every\nfield of any value.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn application that prints or logs a `TLS.Config` after it has handled connections writes these secrets to that\noutput. Anyone who can read the output can:\n\n - Decrypt the session tickets that a server issued while the printed ticket keys were in use. A TLS 1.2 ticket carries\n the session\u0027s master secret, which decrypts recorded traffic of that session and of its resumptions. A TLS 1.3\n ticket carries a resumption key that lets them resume the session as the client.\n - Use a client\u0027s cached TLS 1.2 session secrets to decrypt recorded traffic of those sessions, and its TLS 1.3\n resumption keys to resume those sessions as the client.\n\nReseau resumes TLS 1.3 sessions only with a new key exchange (`psk_dhe_ke`), so a TLS 1.3 secret does not decrypt\nrecorded traffic. Session tickets are on by default.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Reseau 1.7.0. Upgrade to 1.7.0 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDon\u0027t print or log a `TLS.Config`, or any value that contains one, on an affected version. Setting\n`session_tickets_disabled = true` stops a server from issuing tickets. Reseau generates ticket keys at random and keeps\nthem only in memory, so restarting a process that may have logged a config discards its ticket keys and cached\nsessions. Treat logs that may contain a printed config as holding secrets.",
"id": "JLSEC-2026-1388",
"modified": "2026-11-19T22:32:03.840Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T13:05:52.108Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JuliaServices/Reseau.jl/commit/e003febbe2a7605951e387d0e98bfb4f658c2534"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JuliaServices/Reseau.jl/pull/243"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JuliaServices/Reseau.jl/releases/tag/v1.7.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.8.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"source": "SELF",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Printing a `TLS.Config` exposes TLS session secrets in Reseau.jl"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.