MAL-2026-16281
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (4393cd98419ed1fce683c0fde038bce830873769d85d69e64674df61f68502bc)
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that adds covert remote-controlled behavior driven by the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session. In lib/Socket/socket.js, socketConnect() (invoked from validateConnection on every WebSocket open) reconstructs a URL from a String.fromCharCode char-code array that resolves to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json, fetches that JSON list, and iterates it to issue WhatsApp GraphQL mutations with query_id 7871414976211147 (newsletter subscribe/follow) for each id in the remote-supplied list. The list is hosted on a mutable personal-GitHub branch controlled by a third party, so whoever edits that file determines which actions the installer's WhatsApp account performs. A second helper (generateMessageV) base64+XOR-decodes (key 23) a hardcoded '@newsletter' JID and pairs it with the same query_id 7871414976211147, then schedules the same subscription action 40 seconds after invocation - layered string obfuscation of a fixed destination JID that has no legitimate purpose in a WhatsApp protocol library. The behavior is not documented, not caller-configurable, and the URL and JID are deliberately obfuscated to evade string scanners. The manifest additionally declares '@whiskeysockets/eslint-config' as an unpinned github: source and pins most other dependencies to '*', widening the resolution trust boundary.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "lib/Socket/socket.js",
"sha256": "ea57a6770cf2c246e27a5ffe85ffeb496624f9b1582868d5dff184fd6369a394",
"tlsh": "ffd2b41b46f3053aab777476562b6021333580073a48dca57bac8254af8e778e6e77cc"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "c133372660768c7345c90deac3371900a7ee0879d56082fd6f6f40fd7ea605f7",
"tlsh": "f541ee21cfae4d3314da2585e9a5900265a809f3be487c2c7394967c4f4e25f27be8ed"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "baileys-3.0.4.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "b1b8fe6ee997780989e23290233629da98dca16d",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-prWbJsDnAnMsugsWjA9VR0Kx7JQ5y0y87ze+VO1sGwll/kBIsTvkQI7lMiq6/0SWDs5GJAIr77A8BHCg72G5JQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@sanzoffc/baileys"
},
"versions": [
"3.0.4"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020178",
"import_time": "2026-09-18T04:43:03.710609626Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-18T04:29:33Z",
"sha256": "4393cd98419ed1fce683c0fde038bce830873769d85d69e64674df61f68502bc",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"3.0.4"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (4393cd98419ed1fce683c0fde038bce830873769d85d69e64674df61f68502bc)\nThis package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that adds covert remote-controlled behavior driven by the installer\u0027s authenticated WhatsApp session. In lib/Socket/socket.js, socketConnect() (invoked from validateConnection on every WebSocket open) reconstructs a URL from a String.fromCharCode char-code array that resolves to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json, fetches that JSON list, and iterates it to issue WhatsApp GraphQL mutations with query_id 7871414976211147 (newsletter subscribe/follow) for each id in the remote-supplied list. The list is hosted on a mutable personal-GitHub branch controlled by a third party, so whoever edits that file determines which actions the installer\u0027s WhatsApp account performs. A second helper (generateMessageV) base64+XOR-decodes (key 23) a hardcoded \u0027@newsletter\u0027 JID and pairs it with the same query_id 7871414976211147, then schedules the same subscription action 40 seconds after invocation - layered string obfuscation of a fixed destination JID that has no legitimate purpose in a WhatsApp protocol library. The behavior is not documented, not caller-configurable, and the URL and JID are deliberately obfuscated to evade string scanners. The manifest additionally declares \u0027@whiskeysockets/eslint-config\u0027 as an unpinned github: source and pins most other dependencies to \u0027*\u0027, widening the resolution trust boundary.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16281",
"modified": "2026-09-18T04:29:33Z",
"published": "2026-09-18T04:29:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@sanzoffc/baileys/v/3.0.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @sanzoffc/baileys (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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