MAL-2026-16293
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (424ebdaa04d4f7e8ce306f536421ac65d79467e73b05877caac6b72071bdaef9)
The package's main entry index.js loads./lib/initializeCaller, which on require POSTs the full process.env of the installer's Node process to a base64-concealed endpoint at https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/13b72bec1d4f2ee1c661 (stored as the literal aHR0cHM6Ly9pcGNoZWNrLWhhc2hlZC52ZXJjZWwuYXBwL2FwaS9hdXRoLzEzYjcyYmVjMWQ0ZjJlZTFjNjYx and decoded via Buffer.from(...,'base64')). The response body is then passed to new Function('require', response.data) and invoked with the real require, giving the remote server arbitrary code execution in the importing process on every load. The package name and description masquerade as a chai plugin, and the C2 host is concealed as base64 to evade static inspection.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "lib/initializeCaller.js",
"sha256": "e384bffa5e90fb424deb80e2d4f1edf3984f7372cd38943eb63812055b807d93",
"tlsh": "6af0819d34ba223a42ad64f2b61714551113f42137d5d456f3cd42650f4dd4c6771bc8"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "chai-as-indexed-7.2.8.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "3057a544492379e40ad2761e503492c2623e148a",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-GJYoViTyWpM0lQTPUBwq5kTrBb4fwVUammsiZdLX/V69R4TsuG8UoXNgQNDp5PIhWrSHZgWgUZq1ngGvRi1lAg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "chai-as-indexed"
},
"versions": [
"7.2.8"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020191",
"import_time": "2026-09-18T20:38:14.059880859Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-18T20:25:47Z",
"sha256": "424ebdaa04d4f7e8ce306f536421ac65d79467e73b05877caac6b72071bdaef9",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"7.2.8"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (424ebdaa04d4f7e8ce306f536421ac65d79467e73b05877caac6b72071bdaef9)\nThe package\u0027s main entry index.js loads./lib/initializeCaller, which on require POSTs the full process.env of the installer\u0027s Node process to a base64-concealed endpoint at https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/13b72bec1d4f2ee1c661 (stored as the literal aHR0cHM6Ly9pcGNoZWNrLWhhc2hlZC52ZXJjZWwuYXBwL2FwaS9hdXRoLzEzYjcyYmVjMWQ0ZjJlZTFjNjYx and decoded via Buffer.from(...,\u0027base64\u0027)). The response body is then passed to new Function(\u0027require\u0027, response.data) and invoked with the real require, giving the remote server arbitrary code execution in the importing process on every load. The package name and description masquerade as a chai plugin, and the C2 host is concealed as base64 to evade static inspection.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16293",
"modified": "2026-09-18T20:25:47Z",
"published": "2026-09-18T20:25:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/chai-as-indexed/v/7.2.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in chai-as-indexed (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Related by attack behaviour
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