Vulnerability-Lookup

MAL-2026-16364

Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages

Published

2026-09-21 19:51

Modified

2026-09-21 20:18

Summary

Malicious code in bytepack-probe-a7x3 (npm)

Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (1f158536e9d84e6cee18e2a3ce84869e34f1564ec18a1313a9e8c03b304e3d70)

package.json declares a dependency leak-internal whose source is the HTTPS tarball URL https://src-ssrf.bytedance.net/ssrf/probe.tgz rather than a registry version range. On npm install, npm fetches and installs whatever bytes that URL currently returns, executing any lifecycle scripts contained in the fetched tarball. There is no version pin, no integrity hash, and no signature check, so the code executed on the installer's machine is whatever the operator of that host serves at the moment of install. The hostname suggests an SSRF-probe artifact hosted on an internal-looking domain, and the dependency name leak-internal together with the path segment ssrf/probe.tgz indicates the fetched payload is intended to run probing behavior inside the installer's network.

CWE

CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

Credits

Amazon Inspector inspector-research@amazon.com

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          },
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "package.json",
              "sha256": "b49e1d6fa52faa1bbf085825565dde6df4b3ac8dedbbd1f90e4300ef81c0a60c",
              "tlsh": "cae07d20d6141c3334dc04f429f20147bd73cc3f40aab9086387522885ce56735f830c"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "bytepack-probe-a7x3-1.0.0.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "843c6abc35dc90ce1697fdbb21276ad19cd73d3d",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-hCER5zYht/CVBROJpMQHf0UXjdbCR0ZaWKiVgulHtRwgFTyQUUmrT5D5jarzyCZN8GgmPkAkzKM8T1p47TRABA=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "bytepack-probe-a7x3"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0",
        "1.0.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-020275",
        "import_time": "2026-09-21T20:17:15.608358975Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-09-21T19:51:34Z",
        "sha256": "1f158536e9d84e6cee18e2a3ce84869e34f1564ec18a1313a9e8c03b304e3d70",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-020276",
        "import_time": "2026-09-21T20:17:15.645420764Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-09-21T19:51:43Z",
        "sha256": "68a86424e95be011ab100ba078387e7b3ba51169d6027bce287d1f5527a6c437",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.1"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1f158536e9d84e6cee18e2a3ce84869e34f1564ec18a1313a9e8c03b304e3d70)\npackage.json declares a dependency `leak-internal` whose source is the HTTPS tarball URL https://src-ssrf.bytedance.net/ssrf/probe.tgz rather than a registry version range. On `npm install`, npm fetches and installs whatever bytes that URL currently returns, executing any lifecycle scripts contained in the fetched tarball. There is no version pin, no integrity hash, and no signature check, so the code executed on the installer\u0027s machine is whatever the operator of that host serves at the moment of install. The hostname suggests an SSRF-probe artifact hosted on an internal-looking domain, and the dependency name `leak-internal` together with the path segment `ssrf/probe.tgz` indicates the fetched payload is intended to run probing behavior inside the installer\u0027s network.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-16364",
  "modified": "2026-09-21T20:18:32Z",
  "published": "2026-09-21T19:51:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/bytepack-probe-a7x3/v/1.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/bytepack-probe-a7x3/v/1.0.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in bytepack-probe-a7x3 (npm)"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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