MAL-2026-17183
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (72c8a01de8d706d83a4b80b845099c11602ba778a392337cad2d9a8a40090b5d)
The package's custom install command serializes the entire process environment (dict(os.environ)) to JSON and POSTs it to the hardcoded endpoint https://gateway.tego.security during pip install. The exfiltration runs automatically as part of the install lifecycle without user consent, and exceptions are silently swallowed so no error is surfaced to the installer. Because process environments on developer and CI hosts routinely contain credentials (AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, database passwords, and other secret-shaped variables), this indiscriminate bulk-environment upload is a credential-harvesting exfiltration path from installer to a remote author-controlled host.
Source: kam193 (b09488c67894dd74d043a240308c694f0e42464e3a4f371b8d5ebc8a6a589d7b)
During installation, the code exfiltrates all environment variables to a remote location.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-09-tego-managed-agents-test
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
exfiltration-env-variables
-
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "setup.py",
"sha256": "64400569d40054aa6e73a133cd1c40d3402881dd341cfd327770bc0c1b7811ee",
"tlsh": "1901d083e43318a2e68791b688836b383523ad0f1d81b47d36ec11d80f8f47ec42d09d"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "tego_managed_agents_test-0.1.0.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "841eb25a78d3253263788b4e10d5a808d375e1ab7e443fd7f348d11d064f5c3f",
"md5": "c5c0cead321fef3a5b0184277a61fd34",
"sha256": "5afa0b8af0c72de34acbf8855fb5fb1260fffbe6a9bdc002e021e09838e0a0ee"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tego-managed-agents-test"
},
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"domains": [
"gateway.tego.security"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-09-tego-managed-agents-test/tego-managed-agents-test",
"import_time": "2026-09-25T11:17:12.240909973Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-25T10:39:11.241841Z",
"sha256": "b09488c67894dd74d043a240308c694f0e42464e3a4f371b8d5ebc8a6a589d7b",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020557",
"import_time": "2026-09-25T14:20:34.824949496Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-25T14:10:19Z",
"sha256": "72c8a01de8d706d83a4b80b845099c11602ba778a392337cad2d9a8a40090b5d",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (72c8a01de8d706d83a4b80b845099c11602ba778a392337cad2d9a8a40090b5d)\nThe package\u0027s custom install command serializes the entire process environment (dict(os.environ)) to JSON and POSTs it to the hardcoded endpoint https://gateway.tego.security during `pip install`. The exfiltration runs automatically as part of the install lifecycle without user consent, and exceptions are silently swallowed so no error is surfaced to the installer. Because process environments on developer and CI hosts routinely contain credentials (AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, database passwords, and other secret-shaped variables), this indiscriminate bulk-environment upload is a credential-harvesting exfiltration path from installer to a remote author-controlled host.\n\n## Source: kam193 (b09488c67894dd74d043a240308c694f0e42464e3a4f371b8d5ebc8a6a589d7b)\nDuring installation, the code exfiltrates all environment variables to a remote location.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-09-tego-managed-agents-test\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17183",
"modified": "2026-09-25T14:22:37.284604344Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T10:39:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/tego-managed-agents-test"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/tego-managed-agents-test/0.1.0/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in tego-managed-agents-test (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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