MAL-2026-17184
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (8424e4bf8731b950511535a2cb9b41b0bedba02092a73ea304b6730f04aa95fe)
package.json for @airbnb-extended/typescript-config@99.9.1 declares a dependency ltidisafe sourced from a bare HTTPS tarball URL (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.7.8.tgz) instead of a registry version range. On npm install, npm fetches and installs whatever bytes that URL returns, executing any lifecycle scripts inside the fetched tarball. The source is unpinned by integrity hash, is not the npm registry, and is unrelated to any Airbnb-published infrastructure. The scope/name also mimics the well-known @airbnb/typescript-config package, and the version 99.9.1 is implausibly high — a dependency-confusion / lure shape designed to win resolution against a legitimate internal or public package. The tarball URL is mutable by whoever controls the storage bucket, so the delivered payload can change at any time.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "cb990670b194625a35159650078890f930311eec1057b56a2f202e08785eddb0",
"tlsh": "dce026201a65a5330ed501b1882a554bf3705f9f1819bc0c6aeb082c818ce77a8f935c"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "typescript-config-99.9.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "185e4d46bb21373fa1fd597ef64314627bf9ea16",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-IG6t4fsQMZ3K3j9242WcYkr6xEC62sBodfMp0u6baYG5MBVkVjPsODe1EuLEoq3dcQWTWVG1wFVIg8TtIUvGXA=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@airbnb-extended/typescript-config"
},
"versions": [
"99.9.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020561",
"import_time": "2026-09-25T14:20:34.930955197Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-25T14:14:40Z",
"sha256": "8424e4bf8731b950511535a2cb9b41b0bedba02092a73ea304b6730f04aa95fe",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"99.9.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (8424e4bf8731b950511535a2cb9b41b0bedba02092a73ea304b6730f04aa95fe)\npackage.json for @airbnb-extended/typescript-config@99.9.1 declares a dependency `ltidisafe` sourced from a bare HTTPS tarball URL (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.7.8.tgz) instead of a registry version range. On `npm install`, npm fetches and installs whatever bytes that URL returns, executing any lifecycle scripts inside the fetched tarball. The source is unpinned by integrity hash, is not the npm registry, and is unrelated to any Airbnb-published infrastructure. The scope/name also mimics the well-known `@airbnb/typescript-config` package, and the version `99.9.1` is implausibly high \u2014 a dependency-confusion / lure shape designed to win resolution against a legitimate internal or public package. The tarball URL is mutable by whoever controls the storage bucket, so the delivered payload can change at any time.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17184",
"modified": "2026-09-25T14:14:40Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T14:14:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@airbnb-extended/typescript-config/v/99.9.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @airbnb-extended/typescript-config (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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