MAL-2026-17228
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (dc906b81107141fbd85dcabf89fd2f5112c4e4a134045c90d6a35abb4b67d16e)
The package's preinstall.js contains a base64+zlib-encoded 257 KB Windows PE executable. On npm install on Windows, the script decodes the blob and writes it to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Conhost\conhost.exe — a path and filename that impersonates a legitimate Windows console host binary — then spawns it via child_process.spawn with detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', and windowsHide: true, so execution is silent and survives the npm process. The decoded PE contains a section named .kntrat and references the external host 65.87.7.132 and the repository github.com/syskiel/kntrat-e, indicating remote command-and-control functionality (RAT-shaped naming). The package has no legitimate SDK functionality visible; the preinstall hook exists solely to stage and run the embedded executable. Installing this package on a Windows host results in full arbitrary code execution under the installing user, with a masqueraded persistent binary staged under LOCALAPPDATA and a C2 endpoint reachable at 65.87.7.132.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "preinstall.js",
"sha256": "8bc90df9b387849338d9c61a8d379cfbb0d70ea576c0e37e1fb07ba164921807",
"tlsh": "24e312267c5990351b18a613f83217257b336259152cd9363b3a08c709fad98cf7bebb"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "nebulaai-sdk-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "cf2ae5e39d71c8bf56d60ed9a2ae29d98e6c6300",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-OAc2iuXWbZebjdNGXjzg4D4Dhvo6bdXkd19VrGXxNR/c97vcO5YeOo97/UrlYETKlhY/DwsAaTWWmxNIuVbaqA=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nebulaai-sdk"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020608",
"import_time": "2026-09-28T18:24:40.696005333Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-28T18:08:06Z",
"sha256": "dc906b81107141fbd85dcabf89fd2f5112c4e4a134045c90d6a35abb4b67d16e",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (dc906b81107141fbd85dcabf89fd2f5112c4e4a134045c90d6a35abb4b67d16e)\nThe package\u0027s `preinstall.js` contains a base64+zlib-encoded 257 KB Windows PE executable. On `npm install` on Windows, the script decodes the blob and writes it to `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Conhost\\conhost.exe` \u2014 a path and filename that impersonates a legitimate Windows console host binary \u2014 then spawns it via `child_process.spawn` with `detached: true`, `stdio: \u0027ignore\u0027`, and `windowsHide: true`, so execution is silent and survives the npm process. The decoded PE contains a section named `.kntrat` and references the external host `65.87.7.132` and the repository `github.com/syskiel/kntrat-e`, indicating remote command-and-control functionality (RAT-shaped naming). The package has no legitimate SDK functionality visible; the preinstall hook exists solely to stage and run the embedded executable. Installing this package on a Windows host results in full arbitrary code execution under the installing user, with a masqueraded persistent binary staged under LOCALAPPDATA and a C2 endpoint reachable at 65.87.7.132.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17228",
"modified": "2026-09-28T18:08:06Z",
"published": "2026-09-28T18:08:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/nebulaai-sdk/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in nebulaai-sdk (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
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