MAL-2026-17230
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (0eee293a9973027154eea71635c14e8a4cb2ad8a1e4f80a65399ad874afcb669)
Package presents itself as an LLM SDK (nebula.js exposes a small client stub) but declares preinstall: node preinstall.cjs in package.json, and preinstall.cjs is a ~232KB single-line obfuscated blob that runs automatically on npm install. The script wraps its body in a Function(...) constructor and uses a custom PRNG-based string decoder (TEA/xorshift-style constants 0x9e3779b9 / 0x243f6a88 / 0x6a09e667) over a packed printable-ASCII string plus a hex-int array to reconstruct characters via String.fromCharCode, driving a control-flow-flattened switch dispatcher. Node builtins and method names are resolved dynamically at runtime (e.g. Ooa8zU["Bd5Wj1"]("fs")) so module ids, filesystem paths, network destinations, and command strings are not visible without executing the decoder. This obfuscation-plus-lifecycle-hook composition is the canonical install-time dropper / RCE shape: the benign-looking library entry serves as a cover story while the hidden preinstall payload runs on any consumer's machine at install time with the user's privileges, capable of arbitrary filesystem, process, and network operations.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "preinstall.cjs",
"sha256": "5c8e0e83983ba18c900dc18b67c6e6aa1eff939c0a107f2cbc4d4967f392ebaa",
"tlsh": "07342ac8920e2e45e6228f1b40ddfc8efd20545345ba4efafd66520ad9670e293fbd11"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "llm-nebula-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "b88f909b3890d518bd049b975757380ae59242f7",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-/937+hoW4m97kLwTsLfJDFKo/RNcsNFyFh2LnnId7vAG5mQEgC7fAjO2eUc41WmLMN16HYnO8MfwCMLXkotNdg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "llm-nebula"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020610",
"import_time": "2026-09-28T19:40:23.367064504Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-28T19:36:11Z",
"sha256": "0eee293a9973027154eea71635c14e8a4cb2ad8a1e4f80a65399ad874afcb669",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (0eee293a9973027154eea71635c14e8a4cb2ad8a1e4f80a65399ad874afcb669)\nPackage presents itself as an LLM SDK (nebula.js exposes a small client stub) but declares `preinstall: node preinstall.cjs` in package.json, and preinstall.cjs is a ~232KB single-line obfuscated blob that runs automatically on `npm install`. The script wraps its body in a `Function(...)` constructor and uses a custom PRNG-based string decoder (TEA/xorshift-style constants 0x9e3779b9 / 0x243f6a88 / 0x6a09e667) over a packed printable-ASCII string plus a hex-int array to reconstruct characters via `String.fromCharCode`, driving a control-flow-flattened switch dispatcher. Node builtins and method names are resolved dynamically at runtime (e.g. `Ooa8zU[\"Bd5Wj1\"](\"fs\")`) so module ids, filesystem paths, network destinations, and command strings are not visible without executing the decoder. This obfuscation-plus-lifecycle-hook composition is the canonical install-time dropper / RCE shape: the benign-looking library entry serves as a cover story while the hidden preinstall payload runs on any consumer\u0027s machine at install time with the user\u0027s privileges, capable of arbitrary filesystem, process, and network operations.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17230",
"modified": "2026-09-28T19:36:11Z",
"published": "2026-09-28T19:36:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/llm-nebula/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in llm-nebula (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.