MAL-2026-17547
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (c4d8d974b7fabf04fa662971cd8041fb76775bf5ed2902cbbffed0f881e2036d)
Package is published under a CSS-polyfill name but ships thunderboltRegistry.js, which exports Wix internal registry module names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) so that a build resolving any of those names will load this file. On require(), an IIFE runs child_process.execSync to collect id, whoami, uname, ifconfig/ip addr, and the contents of /etc/hosts, plus a beacon containing node version, platform, pid, and hostname, and POSTs the output via fetch to the hardcoded HTTP endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f. The payload clears any require.cache entries referencing 'thunderboltRegistry' and acquires child_process through three fallbacks, including instantiating a new Module via module.constructor to bypass mocks or sandboxes. The declared CSS-polyfill purpose has no relation to this behavior; the shape is a dependency-confusion squat against internal Wix modules.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "thunderboltRegistry.js",
"sha256": "a485cb48081ea590cab385a405886cfe6f30af7d415f30bc8d7937ace461b928",
"tlsh": "e87154a5b99df02065c33438cb7f4049b4bbc6672d6caee0744899b01f7985c01be6f8"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "css-at-scope-polyfill-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "5e679fcafebeb0bafea3ce347f5925a124661831",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-gJRIBJ4jedfAMCc6/qOOoDOgtnSKR459y9B9QJKzPAUVDoAEhaFopx46jHmwCKBpXSeiKwodBEKGry8zkiyy4A=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "css-at-scope-polyfill"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021024",
"import_time": "2026-10-05T03:57:39.597500531Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-05T03:37:15Z",
"sha256": "c4d8d974b7fabf04fa662971cd8041fb76775bf5ed2902cbbffed0f881e2036d",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c4d8d974b7fabf04fa662971cd8041fb76775bf5ed2902cbbffed0f881e2036d)\nPackage is published under a CSS-polyfill name but ships thunderboltRegistry.js, which exports Wix internal registry module names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) so that a build resolving any of those names will load this file. On require(), an IIFE runs child_process.execSync to collect `id`, `whoami`, `uname`, `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, and the contents of /etc/hosts, plus a beacon containing node version, platform, pid, and hostname, and POSTs the output via fetch to the hardcoded HTTP endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f. The payload clears any require.cache entries referencing \u0027thunderboltRegistry\u0027 and acquires child_process through three fallbacks, including instantiating a new Module via module.constructor to bypass mocks or sandboxes. The declared CSS-polyfill purpose has no relation to this behavior; the shape is a dependency-confusion squat against internal Wix modules.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17547",
"modified": "2026-10-05T03:37:15Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T03:37:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-at-scope-polyfill/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in css-at-scope-polyfill (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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