MAL-2026-17563
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (4b74a904a25687bbc34ad321ea019c5083f9a3651457750ed36207a209798f77)
package.json declares a dependency ltidisafe whose source is an off-registry tarball URL (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.8.1.tgz) rather than a semver range on the npm registry. The shipped index.js is an empty stub (module.exports = {}), so the manifest URL is the entire install-time surface. On npm install, npm fetches whatever bytes that URL returns — unpinned, no integrity hash, no registry publisher check — installs the resulting package, and runs any lifecycle scripts inside it. Whoever controls that bucket path controls code execution on the installer's machine.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "8c736df10a5fdc25cd8998c3bdccb89494ea0f3064b2cfaae5f6553f9ccf58ac",
"tlsh": "53e0c2305a65a6334fca11b6482b655bf3718e5f0818bc0c5aeb042c459dab368fa3ad"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "risk-detection-99.9.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "40b3c9f9dc6c0dea5b907091d19d615aa08036dc",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-amzre5e7+U5EZSQdLNlwl+FZtsYmfXSLTdWQEveiFe85UPMUjoCTRwU+Pg/7dupOnFBk+ZUDxPDMbdlIaZ9rVQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "risk-detection"
},
"versions": [
"99.9.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021030",
"import_time": "2026-10-05T03:57:40.103215367Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-05T03:38:10Z",
"sha256": "4b74a904a25687bbc34ad321ea019c5083f9a3651457750ed36207a209798f77",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"99.9.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (4b74a904a25687bbc34ad321ea019c5083f9a3651457750ed36207a209798f77)\npackage.json declares a dependency `ltidisafe` whose source is an off-registry tarball URL (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.8.1.tgz`) rather than a semver range on the npm registry. The shipped `index.js` is an empty stub (`module.exports = {}`), so the manifest URL is the entire install-time surface. On `npm install`, npm fetches whatever bytes that URL returns \u2014 unpinned, no integrity hash, no registry publisher check \u2014 installs the resulting package, and runs any lifecycle scripts inside it. Whoever controls that bucket path controls code execution on the installer\u0027s machine.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17563",
"modified": "2026-10-05T03:38:10Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T03:38:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/risk-detection/v/99.9.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in risk-detection (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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