Vulnerability-Lookup

OESA-2026-4657 (CVE-2026-92543)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-10-29 09:04 – Updated: 2026-10-29 09:04 – Source website

Summary

docker security update

Details

Docker is an open source project to build, ship and run any application as a lightweight container.

Security Fix(es):

Docker Engine classifies a registry hostname as insecure using an any-match DNS check. loadInsecureRegistries() injects 127.0.0.0/8 and ::1/128 as insecure CIDRs by default. isCIDRMatch resolves all of the hostname's addresses and returns true if a single address is in the insecure CIDR list. Because the transport re-dials the hostname rather than the CIDR-matching address, a DNS answer set of one loopback IP plus a non-loopback attacker IP disables certificate verification and enables HTTP fallback for the registry connection.(CVE-2026-92543)

Severity

7.6 (High)


                    
                      CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

URL

Type

	https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bu…	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92543	ADVISORY

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "docker-engine-18.09.0-355.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "docker-engine-debuginfo-18.09.0-355.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "docker-engine-debugsource-18.09.0-355.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "docker-engine-18.09.0-355.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "docker-engine-18.09.0-355.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "docker-engine-debuginfo-18.09.0-355.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "docker-engine-debugsource-18.09.0-355.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "docker",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/docker\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "engine-18.09.0-355.oe2203sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "Docker is an open source project to build, ship and run any application as a lightweight container.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nDocker Engine classifies a registry hostname as insecure using an any-match DNS check. loadInsecureRegistries() injects 127.0.0.0/8 and ::1/128 as insecure CIDRs by default. isCIDRMatch resolves all of the hostname\u0026apos;s addresses and returns true if a single address is in the insecure CIDR list. Because the transport re-dials the hostname rather than the CIDR-matching address, a DNS answer set of one loopback IP plus a non-loopback attacker IP disables certificate verification and enables HTTP fallback for the registry connection.(CVE-2026-92543)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-4657",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T09:04:08Z",
  "published": "2026-10-29T09:04:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4657"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92543"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "docker security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-92543"
  ]
}

CVE-2026-92543 (GCVE-0-2026-92543)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-07 16:44 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:31

Title

Docker Engine insecure-registry fallback via malicious DNS responses

Summary

Severity

7.6 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-07 20:31 UTC

CWE

CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
CWE-319 - Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

Assigner

Docker CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 88/100 over 34 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/…	vendor-advisory

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Docker	Docker Engine	Affected: 0 , < 29.8.2 (semver)
Moby	Moby	Affected: 0 , < v2.0.0-beta.25 (semver)

Credits

Adam Korczynski of ADA Logics

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-92543",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-07T20:31:15.802430Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-07T20:31:28.770Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Docker Engine",
          "vendor": "Docker",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "29.8.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "github.com/moby/moby/v2",
          "product": "Moby",
          "vendor": "Moby",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "v2.0.0-beta.25",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Adam Korczynski of ADA Logics"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Docker Engine classifies a registry hostname as insecure using an any-match DNS check. loadInsecureRegistries() injects 127.0.0.0/8 and ::1/128 as insecure CIDRs by default. isCIDRMatch resolves all of the hostname\u0027s addresses and returns true if a single address is in the insecure CIDR list. Because the transport re-dials the hostname rather than the CIDR-matching address, a DNS answer set of one loopback IP plus a non-loopback attacker IP disables certificate verification and enables HTTP fallback for the registry connection."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Disclosure of registry credentials sent via X-Registry-Auth to an attacker-controlled host with an invalid certificate, or substitution of a trusted image tag with attacker-controlled manifest and layers in image store."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.6,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-295",
              "description": "CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-319",
              "description": "CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-07T18:27:34.058Z",
        "orgId": "686469e6-3ff6-451b-ab8b-cf5b9e89401e",
        "shortName": "Docker"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-7cfq-22r6-qp73"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Docker Engine insecure-registry fallback via malicious DNS responses",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that registry hostnames resolve only to trusted, non-loopback IP addresses. For example, administrators can use a trusted DNS configuration or a local hosts-file entry to pin the registry hostname to its expected address. Alternatively, restrict outbound network access from the Docker daemon so that registry connections can only reach trusted registry endpoints. Removing entries from the insecure-registries configuration is not sufficient, because Docker Engine automatically treats the 127.0.0.0/8 and ::1/128 ranges as insecure. Using a trusted CA certificate for the registry does not mitigate this issue if the registry hostname can also resolve to a loopback address, because the resulting registry configuration permits connections without certificate verification. As a defense in depth against image substitution, images can be referenced by digest rather than by a mutable tag. This does not prevent disclosure of registry credentials and should not be considered a complete workaround."
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "686469e6-3ff6-451b-ab8b-cf5b9e89401e",
    "assignerShortName": "Docker",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-92543",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-07T16:44:21.237Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-16T13:00:33.499Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-07T20:31:28.770Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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