RUSTSEC-2026-0293

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-21 12:00 – Updated: 2026-09-21 09:10 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Double free / use-after-free in `Consumer::skip` and `Consumer::clear` when an element's `Drop` panics
Details

Consumer::skip() and Consumer::clear() are not panic-safe. They drop the consumed elements in place and only afterwards call advance_read_index() to move the ring buffer's read index past them. If an element's Drop panics mid-loop, advance_read_index() is never reached, so the read index still points at the already-dropped elements. When the ring buffer is later dropped, its destructor re-visits those slots and drops the same elements a second time — a double free (CWE-415) / use-after-free (CWE-416) reachable from safe Rust, confirmed under AddressSanitizer.

Consumer::clear() delegates to Consumer::skip(self.len()), so both share the same root cause and the same fix.

Mitigation

Update to 0.5.2 or later (fixed in agerasev/ringbuf#60).

References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "ringbuf::traits::consumer::Consumer::clear",
            "ringbuf::traits::consumer::Consumer::skip"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "ringbuf",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/ringbuf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`Consumer::skip()` and `Consumer::clear()` are not panic-safe. They drop the\nconsumed elements in place and only afterwards call `advance_read_index()` to move\nthe ring buffer\u0027s read index past them. If an element\u0027s `Drop` panics mid-loop,\n`advance_read_index()` is never reached, so the read index still points at the\nalready-dropped elements. When the ring buffer is later dropped, its destructor\nre-visits those slots and drops the same elements a second time \u2014 a double free\n(CWE-415) / use-after-free (CWE-416) reachable from safe Rust, confirmed under\nAddressSanitizer.\n\n`Consumer::clear()` delegates to `Consumer::skip(self.len())`, so both share the\nsame root cause and the same fix.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpdate to 0.5.2 or later (fixed in agerasev/ringbuf#60).",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0293",
  "modified": "2026-09-21T09:10:46Z",
  "published": "2026-09-21T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/ringbuf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0293.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/agerasev/ringbuf/pull/60"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Double free / use-after-free in `Consumer::skip` and `Consumer::clear` when an element\u0027s `Drop` panics"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.


Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.