RUSTSEC-2026-0366 (GHSA-7632-4Q2X-HVJW)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-16 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-16 23:27 – Source websiteImpact
In affected versions, parsing deeply nested input with pest_grammars::json::JsonParser can exhaust the native stack and abort the hosting process. Applications that accept attacker-controlled JSON without suitable resource limits may therefore be vulnerable to denial of service.
The reported reproduction demonstrates this behavior with deeply nested JSON arrays. The nesting required to trigger an overflow depends on the platform, available stack space, and build configuration; there is no portable safe nesting threshold.
Patches
Upgrade to pest_grammars 2.9.3 or later.
Version 2.9.3 requires the updated pest runtime and includes regression tests for deeply nested JSON with the optional call budget disabled. Supported std builds automatically check available native stack headroom at parser checkpoints and return a handled stack limit reached error when insufficient space is detected. This protection operates independently of pest::set_call_limit(). See the 2.9.3 dependencies and deep-nesting regression tests.
These checks are best-effort. They do not provide universal stack-overflow protection, apply when stack bounds cannot be determined, or provide native-stack protection in no_std builds.
Workarounds and defense in depth
Applications unable to upgrade should reject excessive nesting before invoking the affected parser or configure a suitably conservative pest::set_call_limit() budget. A call budget is not a portable stack-depth guarantee.
Even after upgrading, applications parsing untrusted input should enforce workload-appropriate input, work, memory, and concurrency limits. Stack checks and call budgets do not enforce elapsed-time deadlines. Where a hard deadline or cancellation is required, use supervised parsing as described in the security policy: Parsing Untrusted Input.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"denial-of-service"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"pest_grammars::json::JsonParser::parse"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "pest_grammars",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/pest_grammars"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.3"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-7632-4q2x-hvjw"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nIn affected versions, parsing deeply nested input with `pest_grammars::json::JsonParser` can exhaust the native stack and abort the hosting process. Applications that accept attacker-controlled JSON without suitable resource limits may therefore be vulnerable to denial of service.\n\nThe reported reproduction demonstrates this behavior with deeply nested JSON arrays. The nesting required to trigger an overflow depends on the platform, available stack space, and build configuration; there is no portable safe nesting threshold.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to `pest_grammars` 2.9.3 or later.\n\nVersion 2.9.3 requires the updated `pest` runtime and includes regression tests for deeply nested JSON with the optional call budget disabled. Supported std builds automatically check available native stack headroom at parser checkpoints and return a handled stack limit reached error when insufficient space is detected. This protection operates independently of `pest::set_call_limit()`. See the [2.9.3 dependencies](https://github.com/pest-parser/pest/blob/v2.9.3/grammars/Cargo.toml#L16-L18) and [deep-nesting regression tests](https://github.com/pest-parser/pest/blob/v2.9.3/grammars/src/lib.rs#L94-L215).\n\nThese checks are best-effort. They do not provide universal stack-overflow protection, apply when stack bounds cannot be determined, or provide native-stack protection in no_std builds.\n\n## Workarounds and defense in depth\n\nApplications unable to upgrade should reject excessive nesting before invoking the affected parser or configure a suitably conservative `pest::set_call_limit()` budget. A call budget is not a portable stack-depth guarantee.\n\nEven after upgrading, applications parsing untrusted input should enforce workload-appropriate input, work, memory, and concurrency limits. Stack checks and call budgets do not enforce elapsed-time deadlines. Where a hard deadline or cancellation is required, use supervised parsing as described in the [security policy: Parsing Untrusted Input](https://github.com/pest-parser/pest/security/policy#parsing-untrusted-input).",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0366",
"modified": "2026-10-16T23:27:42Z",
"published": "2026-10-16T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/pest_grammars"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0366.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pest-parser/pest/pull/1212"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Stack overflow when parsing deeply nested input in pest_grammars"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.