AZL-105996 (CVE-2026-98169)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:17 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()
If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE, smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length of the server's reply.
Because SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied OutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply results in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent copy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab memory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check is ineffective as it only reduces ret_data_len.
Fix this by rejecting replies shorter than sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) with -EIO. Note that the bound is set to the 12-byte struct size rather than the 16-byte MIN_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SIZE defined in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15.1, because 12 bytes is exactly what copy_to_user() attempts to read.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98169 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()\n\nIf snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE,\nsmb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to\nsizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length\nof the server\u0027s reply.\n\nBecause SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied\nOutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply\nresults in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent\ncopy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab\nmemory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check is ineffective as it\nonly reduces ret_data_len.\n\nFix this by rejecting replies shorter than\nsizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) with -EIO. Note that the bound is set\nto the 12-byte struct size rather than the 16-byte\nMIN_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SIZE defined in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15.1, because 12 bytes\nis exactly what copy_to_user() attempts to read.",
"id": "AZL-105996",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:17:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98169"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98169 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98169"
]
}
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