AZL-106017 (CVE-2026-98167)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:17 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs
In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.
This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().
Fix this by setting server->total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98167 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix server-\u003etotal_read for compound encrypted PDUs\n\nIn receive_encrypted_standard(), server-\u003etotal_read is left at the\nfull decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted\nframe. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size\nto smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly\nvalidate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.\n\nThis allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,\nleading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().\n\nFix this by setting server-\u003etotal_read to the true length of the\ncurrent sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining\npdu_length for the last one.",
"id": "AZL-106017",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:17:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98167"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98167 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98167"
]
}
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