AZL-106092 (CVE-2026-98222)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: encrypted: fix integer overflow of datablob_len
encrypted_key_alloc() stores datablob_len in a u16. It is computed from multiple string and payload lengths. If the result exceeds U16_MAX, the assignment truncates the allocation size. KASAN reports a 32760-byte slab-out-of-bounds write when __ekey_init() copies the master key description into the undersized buffer.
The total payload length stored in key->datalen is also a u16. Use check_add_overflow() to reject values that do not fit either destination, and use kzalloc_flex() for the flexible-array allocation.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98222 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKEYS: encrypted: fix integer overflow of datablob_len\n\nencrypted_key_alloc() stores datablob_len in a u16. It is computed from\nmultiple string and payload lengths. If the result exceeds U16_MAX, the\nassignment truncates the allocation size. KASAN reports a 32760-byte\nslab-out-of-bounds write when __ekey_init() copies the master key\ndescription into the undersized buffer.\n\nThe total payload length stored in key-\u003edatalen is also a u16. Use\ncheck_add_overflow() to reject values that do not fit either destination,\nand use kzalloc_flex() for the flexible-array allocation.",
"id": "AZL-106092",
"modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98222"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98222 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98222"
]
}
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