AZL-106128 (CVE-2026-98241)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths
xfrm6_local_rxpmtu() and xfrm6_local_error() dereference skb->sk as if it always pointed at a full IPv6 socket.
That is not guaranteed. TCP SYN-ACK skbs can be owned by a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock while the output path itself is driven by the full listener. If rerouting selects an IPv6 XFRM tunnel route with a lower MTU, the local PMTU/error handling path can reach these callbacks with that mini-socket still attached to the skb.
The callbacks then miscast the request socket as a full inet/IPv6 socket and can read beyond the request_sock allocation when they access inet_sock or ipv6_pinfo state.
Resolve the owner with skb_to_full_sk() in both callbacks and bail out when no full socket is attached. This matches the surrounding XFRM IPv6 PMTU/error logic, which already reasons about full sockets with skb_to_full_sk().
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98241 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths\n\nxfrm6_local_rxpmtu() and xfrm6_local_error() dereference skb-\u003esk as if it\nalways pointed at a full IPv6 socket.\n\nThat is not guaranteed. TCP SYN-ACK skbs can be owned by a\nTCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock while the output path itself is driven by the\nfull listener. If rerouting selects an IPv6 XFRM tunnel route with a lower\nMTU, the local PMTU/error handling path can reach these callbacks with that\nmini-socket still attached to the skb.\n\nThe callbacks then miscast the request socket as a full inet/IPv6 socket and\ncan read beyond the request_sock allocation when they access inet_sock or\nipv6_pinfo state.\n\nResolve the owner with skb_to_full_sk() in both callbacks and bail out when\nno full socket is attached. This matches the surrounding XFRM IPv6 PMTU/error\nlogic, which already reasons about full sockets with skb_to_full_sk().",
"id": "AZL-106128",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98241"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98241 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98241"
]
}
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