AZL-106134 (CVE-2026-98186)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-98186 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length

mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing.

Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length\n\nmwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a\nbeacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that\nmany 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight\nfrom the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the\nelement\u0027s own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id\nalone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted\nRSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up\nto 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the\nkmemdup()\u0027d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe\nresponse is processed during scan-result parsing.\n\nPass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk\nto the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value\nbefore any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot\nunderflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.\n\nFound by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).",
  "id": "AZL-106134",
  "modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
  "published": "2026-10-06T09:18:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98186"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-98186 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-98186"
  ]
}



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