AZL-106152 (CVE-2026-98290)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: avoid socket lock inversion in listener cleanup
rfcomm_sock_cleanup_listen() closes unaccepted child sockets through rfcomm_sock_close(), which takes the child socket lock before rfcomm_dlc_close() acquires rfcomm_mutex. The RFCOMM worker takes these locks in reverse order while handling connections and DLC state changes, so lockdep reports a possible deadlock.
Close dequeued children without taking their socket lock. The accept queue owns a reference to each child, and bt_accept_dequeue() locks the child while unlinking it and clearing its parent pointer.
Dropping the child lock makes it important to prevent a concurrent rfcomm_connect_ind() from enqueueing a new child after cleanup observes an empty queue. Set a listening socket to BT_CLOSED while its lock is still held, before dropping the lock and draining the queue. The state check in rfcomm_connect_ind() then rejects new children once cleanup starts.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98290 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: RFCOMM: avoid socket lock inversion in listener cleanup\n\nrfcomm_sock_cleanup_listen() closes unaccepted child sockets through\nrfcomm_sock_close(), which takes the child socket lock before\nrfcomm_dlc_close() acquires rfcomm_mutex. The RFCOMM worker takes these\nlocks in reverse order while handling connections and DLC state changes,\nso lockdep reports a possible deadlock.\n\nClose dequeued children without taking their socket lock. The accept queue\nowns a reference to each child, and bt_accept_dequeue() locks the child\nwhile unlinking it and clearing its parent pointer.\n\nDropping the child lock makes it important to prevent a concurrent\nrfcomm_connect_ind() from enqueueing a new child after cleanup observes an\nempty queue. Set a listening socket to BT_CLOSED while its lock is still\nheld, before dropping the lock and draining the queue. The state check in\nrfcomm_connect_ind() then rejects new children once cleanup starts.",
"id": "AZL-106152",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98290"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98290 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98290"
]
}
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