AZL-106176 (CVE-2026-98367)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Clear association under lock if siw_qp_modify fails in siw_accept
We need to clear cep before release state_lock as siw_qp_llp_close and siw_qp_modify->siw_qp_llp_close did.
Otherwise if siw_qp_modify() fails in siw_accept(), the QP's state_lock is released before the error path cleanup. A concurrent ibv_modify_qp() transitioning the QP to ERROR can race in this window:
siw_accept() ibv_modify_qp(ERROR) ---------------------- ---------------------- siw_qp_modify() fails up_write(&qp->state_lock) down_write(&qp->state_lock) nextstate_from_idle(): if (qp->cep) siw_cep_put(qp->cep) <- frees cep qp->cep = NULL goto error cep->qp = NULL <- UAF
Clear qp->cep and drop the association reference taken by siw_cep_get(), all under the write lock held from the initial down_write(&qp->state_lock). Thread B therefore sees qp->cep == NULL, skips its own put, and cannot free the cep before siw_accept() is done with it.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98367 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/siw: Clear association under lock if siw_qp_modify fails in siw_accept\n\nWe need to clear cep before release state_lock as siw_qp_llp_close and\nsiw_qp_modify-\u003esiw_qp_llp_close did.\n\nOtherwise if siw_qp_modify() fails in siw_accept(), the QP\u0027s state_lock\nis released before the error path cleanup. A concurrent ibv_modify_qp()\ntransitioning the QP to ERROR can race in this window:\n\n siw_accept() ibv_modify_qp(ERROR)\n ---------------------- ----------------------\n siw_qp_modify() fails\n up_write(\u0026qp-\u003estate_lock)\n down_write(\u0026qp-\u003estate_lock)\n nextstate_from_idle():\n\t\t\t\t if (qp-\u003ecep)\n siw_cep_put(qp-\u003ecep) \u003c- frees cep\n qp-\u003ecep = NULL\n goto error\n cep-\u003eqp = NULL \u003c- UAF\n\nClear qp-\u003ecep and drop the association reference taken by siw_cep_get(),\nall under the write lock held from the initial down_write(\u0026qp-\u003estate_lock).\nThread B therefore sees qp-\u003ecep == NULL, skips its own put, and cannot free\nthe cep before siw_accept() is done with it.",
"id": "AZL-106176",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98367"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98367 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98367"
]
}
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