AZL-106290 (CVE-2026-98354)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mad: Fix receive buffer leak when PKey enforcement fails
ib_mad_complete_recv() initializes mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list and then runs ib_mad_enforce_security() before linking recv_buf onto that list. On failure it calls ib_free_recv_mad(), which only walks rmpp_list and frees the ib_mad_private of every buffer found there. As the list is still empty at that point, nothing is freed at all.
The caller cannot clean up either: ib_mad_recv_done() sets recv to NULL right after ib_mad_complete_recv() returns, assuming the MAD layer took ownership of the buffer. Every MAD that fails the PKey check therefore leaks one ib_mad_private (about 300 bytes per IB port MAD, ~2K for OPA), and a remote node can trigger this repeatedly by sending MADs with a wrong PKey.
Link recv_buf onto rmpp_list right after the list is initialized, so the error path has something to free.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98354 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/mad: Fix receive buffer leak when PKey enforcement fails\n\nib_mad_complete_recv() initializes mad_recv_wc-\u003ermpp_list and then runs\nib_mad_enforce_security() before linking recv_buf onto that list. On\nfailure it calls ib_free_recv_mad(), which only walks rmpp_list and frees\nthe ib_mad_private of every buffer found there. As the list is still\nempty at that point, nothing is freed at all.\n\nThe caller cannot clean up either: ib_mad_recv_done() sets recv to NULL\nright after ib_mad_complete_recv() returns, assuming the MAD layer took\nownership of the buffer. Every MAD that fails the PKey check therefore\nleaks one ib_mad_private (about 300 bytes per IB port MAD, ~2K for OPA),\nand a remote node can trigger this repeatedly by sending MADs with a\nwrong PKey.\n\nLink recv_buf onto rmpp_list right after the list is initialized, so the\nerror path has something to free.",
"id": "AZL-106290",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98354"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98354 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98354"
]
}
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