AZL-106313 (CVE-2026-98287)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-98287 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

pppoatm: ensure a writable skb header and linear data

In pppoatm_send(), LLC encapsulation checks whether there is sufficient headroom for the 4-byte LLC header, but does not ensure that the skb header is writable.

Normal transmit packets passing through ppp_start_xmit() have their header unshared via skb_cow_head(). However, packets can also reach pppoatm_send() via PPP channel bridging (PPPIOCBRIDGECHAN) without going through ppp_start_xmit().

Use skb_cow_head() to ensure both sufficient headroom and a writable header before pushing the LLC header.

While at it: - Call pskb_may_pull(skb, 1) before inspecting skb->data[0] to prevent out-of-bounds reads on zero-length or non-linear frames (e.g. from bridging). - Defer SC_COMP_PROT protocol compression until after pppoatm_may_send() succeeds. This eliminates the temporary skb allocation on admission failure and completely removes the fragile "undo" heuristic at the nospace label, avoiding any risk of reading uninitialized headroom or performing an unbalanced skb_push().

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npppoatm: ensure a writable skb header and linear data\n\nIn pppoatm_send(), LLC encapsulation checks whether there is sufficient\nheadroom for the 4-byte LLC header, but does not ensure that the skb header\nis writable.\n\nNormal transmit packets passing through ppp_start_xmit() have their header\nunshared via skb_cow_head(). However, packets can also reach pppoatm_send()\nvia PPP channel bridging (PPPIOCBRIDGECHAN) without going through\nppp_start_xmit().\n\nUse skb_cow_head() to ensure both sufficient headroom and a writable\nheader before pushing the LLC header.\n\nWhile at it:\n- Call pskb_may_pull(skb, 1) before inspecting skb-\u003edata[0] to prevent\n  out-of-bounds reads on zero-length or non-linear frames (e.g. from\n  bridging).\n- Defer SC_COMP_PROT protocol compression until after pppoatm_may_send()\n  succeeds. This eliminates the temporary skb allocation on admission failure\n  and completely removes the fragile \"undo\" heuristic at the nospace label,\n  avoiding any risk of reading uninitialized headroom or performing an\n  unbalanced skb_push().",
  "id": "AZL-106313",
  "modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
  "published": "2026-10-06T09:18:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98287"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-98287 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-98287"
  ]
}



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