AZL-106347 (CVE-2026-98331)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: unlist vifs when their netdev is unregistered
mac80211 only removes vifs from the local->interfaces list when an interface is removed via ieee80211_if_remove(), before it unregisters the netdev. However, it's possible for a netdev to be unregistered without going through that: When the netns that holds the wiphy is destroyed, the wiphy is supposed to move to the init_ns, but that can run into allocation failures.
Then, mac80211 has an interface listed that doesn't exist, and will eventually hit
BUG: failure at net/wireless/core.h:141/wiphy_to_rdev()! ... _cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0x24/0x36a [cfg80211] cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0x15/0x1d [cfg80211] ieee80211_remove_interfaces+0x1ff/0x257 [mac80211] ieee80211_unregister_hw+0x73/0x1d1 [mac80211] mac80211_hwsim_del_radio+0x114/0x166 [mac80211_hwsim]
Remove the interface from the list in ->ndo_uninit if it's still around to avoid this.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98331 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: unlist vifs when their netdev is unregistered\n\nmac80211 only removes vifs from the local-\u003einterfaces list when\nan interface is removed via ieee80211_if_remove(), before it\nunregisters the netdev. However, it\u0027s possible for a netdev to\nbe unregistered without going through that: When the netns that\nholds the wiphy is destroyed, the wiphy is supposed to move to\nthe init_ns, but that can run into allocation failures.\n\nThen, mac80211 has an interface listed that doesn\u0027t exist, and\nwill eventually hit\n\n BUG: failure at net/wireless/core.h:141/wiphy_to_rdev()!\n ...\n _cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0x24/0x36a [cfg80211]\n cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0x15/0x1d [cfg80211]\n ieee80211_remove_interfaces+0x1ff/0x257 [mac80211]\n ieee80211_unregister_hw+0x73/0x1d1 [mac80211]\n mac80211_hwsim_del_radio+0x114/0x166 [mac80211_hwsim]\n\nRemove the interface from the list in -\u003endo_uninit if it\u0027s still\naround to avoid this.",
"id": "AZL-106347",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98331"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98331 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98331"
]
}
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