AZL-106368 (CVE-2026-98253)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-98253 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/ucma: Serialize join and leave on copy_to_user failure

rdma_join_multicast() queues RoCE work that later reads the ucma_multicast through event->param.ud.private_data, then list_add()s the CMA multicast at the head of id_priv->mc_list. rdma_leave_multicast() matches only by sockaddr and destroys the first hit.

ucma_process_join() used to drop ctx->mutex after a successful join and retake it only if copy_to_user() failed. Two concurrent JOIN_MCAST calls with the same address can therefore insert a second CMA entry before the first thread's leave. leave then cancels the newer work and the older worker still dereferences the ucma_multicast that the first thread frees.

Keep ctx->mutex held from rdma_join_multicast() through copy_to_user() and, on -EFAULT, through rdma_leave_multicast() so leave cannot miss this join. Do not leave if join itself failed: that path never published this address on mc_list, and a leave-by-addr would destroy an earlier successful join.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/ucma: Serialize join and leave on copy_to_user failure\n\nrdma_join_multicast() queues RoCE work that later reads the ucma_multicast\nthrough event-\u003eparam.ud.private_data, then list_add()s the CMA multicast\nat the head of id_priv-\u003emc_list. rdma_leave_multicast() matches only by\nsockaddr and destroys the first hit.\n\nucma_process_join() used to drop ctx-\u003emutex after a successful join and\nretake it only if copy_to_user() failed. Two concurrent JOIN_MCAST calls\nwith the same address can therefore insert a second CMA entry before the\nfirst thread\u0027s leave. leave then cancels the newer work and the older\nworker still dereferences the ucma_multicast that the first thread frees.\n\nKeep ctx-\u003emutex held from rdma_join_multicast() through copy_to_user() and,\non -EFAULT, through rdma_leave_multicast() so leave cannot miss this join.\nDo not leave if join itself failed: that path never published this address\non mc_list, and a leave-by-addr would destroy an earlier successful join.",
  "id": "AZL-106368",
  "modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
  "published": "2026-10-06T09:18:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98253"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-98253 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-98253"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.