AZL-106404 (CVE-2026-98181)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gud: fix out-of-bounds write in gud_plane_atomic_check()
The plane property loop uses req->properties[num_properties + i] as write
index while simultaneously incrementing num_properties inside the loop.
At iteration i, num_properties has also incremented by i, so the write
is done at initial_num_properties + 2*i, skipping every other index and
advancing by 2 per iteration.
With just 2 connector and 32 plane properties the last write happens at index 64, one slot past the end of the 64-slot (indices 0–63) allocation. A USB device can trigger OOB by advertising the maximum number of properties.
Fix by dropping the redundant + i; num_properties is already the correct
running index, as gud_connector_fill_properties() fills the preceding
slots.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98181 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/gud: fix out-of-bounds write in gud_plane_atomic_check()\n\nThe plane property loop uses req-\u003eproperties[num_properties + i] as write\nindex while simultaneously incrementing `num_properties` inside the loop.\nAt iteration i, num_properties has also incremented by i, so the write\nis done at `initial_num_properties + 2*i`, skipping every other index and\nadvancing by 2 per iteration.\n\nWith just 2 connector and 32 plane properties the last write happens at\nindex 64, one slot past the end of the 64-slot (indices 0\u201363)\nallocation. A USB device can trigger OOB by advertising the maximum\nnumber of properties.\n\nFix by dropping the redundant `+ i`; num_properties is already the correct\nrunning index, as gud_connector_fill_properties() fills the preceding\nslots.",
"id": "AZL-106404",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98181"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98181 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98181"
]
}
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