AZL-106437 (CVE-2026-98246)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Serialize local codec list cleanup
hci_dev_close_sync() clears hdev->local_codecs after releasing hdev->lock. Codec list additions and both traversals in sco_sock_getsockopt() use that lock, but the close path does not. A close and BT_CODEC query can therefore interleave as follows:
hci_dev_close_sync() sco_sock_getsockopt() hci_dev_lock() fetch codec entry hci_codec_list_clear() kfree(entry) read entry->id
The reader then accesses an entry which the close path has freed. KASAN
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_sock_getsockopt+0xfa0/0xfe0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881001c3450 Call Trace: sco_sock_getsockopt+0xfa0/0xfe0 do_sock_getsockopt+0x537/0x7b0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf2/0x170 Allocated by task 92: hci_codec_list_add.isra.0+0x2c/0x440 hci_read_codec_capabilities+0x224/0x590 hci_read_supported_codecs+0x2c2/0x640 Freed by task 92: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 hci_codec_list_clear+0xd8/0x160 hci_dev_close_sync+0x92a/0xfa0
Take hdev->lock around the clear operation at its existing point in the close path. This makes the clear wait for active readers and prevents a new traversal until the list is empty without changing teardown ordering.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98246 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_sync: Serialize local codec list cleanup\n\nhci_dev_close_sync() clears hdev-\u003elocal_codecs after releasing hdev-\u003elock.\nCodec list additions and both traversals in sco_sock_getsockopt() use that\nlock, but the close path does not. A close and BT_CODEC query can therefore\ninterleave as follows:\n\n hci_dev_close_sync() sco_sock_getsockopt()\n hci_dev_lock()\n fetch codec entry\n hci_codec_list_clear()\n kfree(entry)\n read entry-\u003eid\n\nThe reader then accesses an entry which the close path has freed. KASAN\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_sock_getsockopt+0xfa0/0xfe0\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881001c3450\n Call Trace:\n sco_sock_getsockopt+0xfa0/0xfe0\n do_sock_getsockopt+0x537/0x7b0\n __sys_getsockopt+0xf2/0x170\n Allocated by task 92:\n hci_codec_list_add.isra.0+0x2c/0x440\n hci_read_codec_capabilities+0x224/0x590\n hci_read_supported_codecs+0x2c2/0x640\n Freed by task 92:\n kfree+0x131/0x3c0\n hci_codec_list_clear+0xd8/0x160\n hci_dev_close_sync+0x92a/0xfa0\n\nTake hdev-\u003elock around the clear operation at its existing point in the\nclose path. This makes the clear wait for active readers and prevents a new\ntraversal until the list is empty without changing teardown ordering.",
"id": "AZL-106437",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98246"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98246 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98246"
]
}
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