AZL-108135 (CVE-2026-98406)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-14 14:17 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver
ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is still present in the driver.
When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits
wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask
Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate() in wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls rdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in cfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but flags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails.
When the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued during interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the running check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear.
Check IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before calling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in driver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not in driver.
This change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in cfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared under RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and drv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free against driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other not-running paths use and does not introduce new locking.
[also add second syzbot report]
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98406 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.159.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.159.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver\n\nieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via\nieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is\nstill present in the driver.\n\nWhen sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the\ncall reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits\n\n wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0\n WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask\n\nSyzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows\nwext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling\nioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate()\nin wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls\nrdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in\ncfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but\nflags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails.\n\nWhen the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued\nduring interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the\nrunning check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear.\n\nCheck IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before\ncalling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in\ndriver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not\nin driver.\n\nThis change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in\ncfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared\nunder RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and\ndrv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free\nagainst driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other\nnot-running paths use and does not introduce new locking.\n\n[also add second syzbot report]",
"id": "AZL-108135",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-14T14:17:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98406"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98406 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.159.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98406"
]
}
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