AZL-110058 (CVE-2026-108518)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-20 22:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-108518 affecting package perl-DBI for versions less than 1.656-1
Details

DBI versions before 1.656 for Perl crash via type confusion in dbi_profile when a database handle is destroyed under a Profile Path with an {attr} element.

An {attr} element names a database handle attribute, which dbi_profile reads from the handle's inner hash. It expects the inner handle as a reference and dereferences it, but a handle that is being destroyed hands back the inner hash itself, so the dereference yields the hash's bucket array. A type check on that pointer usually fails and the call goes unprofiled. When the memory it addresses passes the check, the attribute lookup dereferences a NULL or invalid pointer and the process dies on SIGSEGV.

The Path is set by the application, by the Profile handle attribute, or by the DBI_PROFILE environment variable, so DBI_PROFILE={ImplementorClass} can crash an unmodified program.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 perl-DBI
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/perl-DBI
Affected: < 1.656-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "perl-DBI",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/perl-DBI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.656-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "DBI versions before 1.656 for Perl crash via type confusion in dbi_profile when a database handle is destroyed under a Profile Path with an {attr} element.\n\nAn {attr} element names a database handle attribute, which dbi_profile reads from the handle\u0027s inner hash. It expects the inner handle as a reference and dereferences it, but a handle that is being destroyed hands back the inner hash itself, so the dereference yields the hash\u0027s bucket array. A type check on that pointer usually fails and the call goes unprofiled. When the memory it addresses passes the check, the attribute lookup dereferences a NULL or invalid pointer and the process dies on SIGSEGV.\n\nThe Path is set by the application, by the Profile handle attribute, or by the DBI_PROFILE environment variable, so `DBI_PROFILE={ImplementorClass}` can crash an unmodified program.",
  "id": "AZL-110058",
  "modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
  "published": "2026-10-20T22:18:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108518"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-108518 affecting package perl-DBI for versions less than 1.656-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-108518"
  ]
}



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