AZL-114374 (CVE-2026-99319)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-11-18 09:17 – Updated: 2026-11-19 05:26 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usx2y: Refuse a retried DSP load after a failure
snd_usx2y_hwdep_dsp_load() sets up the asynchronous sequence URBs and the interrupt URB when the FPGA firmware image with index 1 is loaded, and then creates the ALSA devices. If usx2y_in04_init() or usx2y_create_alsa_devices() fails, the URBs that were already set up are left in place.
The core keeps the index unloaded when the callback fails, so user space may issue the same request again. The second attempt then enters usx2y_async_seq04_init() or usx2y_in04_init() with the URBs still allocated and trips WARN_ON(usx2y->as04.buffer) or WARN_ON(usx2y->in04_urb).
The URBs cannot be released at this point: the card may already have registered PCM devices that user space can still open, and the disconnect handler accesses the URBs without holding the DSP lock. Mark the chip as hung instead, so that a retried request is refused with -ENODEV and the assertions keep their meaning. The URBs are released by snd_usx2y_card_private_free() when the card is freed.
A failing usx2y_async_seq04_init() still releases its own URBs, so that path remains retryable.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99319 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: usx2y: Refuse a retried DSP load after a failure\n\nsnd_usx2y_hwdep_dsp_load() sets up the asynchronous sequence URBs and\nthe interrupt URB when the FPGA firmware image with index 1 is loaded,\nand then creates the ALSA devices. If usx2y_in04_init() or\nusx2y_create_alsa_devices() fails, the URBs that were already set up\nare left in place.\n\nThe core keeps the index unloaded when the callback fails, so user\nspace may issue the same request again. The second attempt then enters\nusx2y_async_seq04_init() or usx2y_in04_init() with the URBs still\nallocated and trips WARN_ON(usx2y-\u003eas04.buffer) or\nWARN_ON(usx2y-\u003ein04_urb).\n\nThe URBs cannot be released at this point: the card may already have\nregistered PCM devices that user space can still open, and the\ndisconnect handler accesses the URBs without holding the DSP lock.\nMark the chip as hung instead, so that a retried request is refused\nwith -ENODEV and the assertions keep their meaning. The URBs are\nreleased by snd_usx2y_card_private_free() when the card is freed.\n\nA failing usx2y_async_seq04_init() still releases its own URBs, so that\npath remains retryable.",
"id": "AZL-114374",
"modified": "2026-11-19T05:26:20Z",
"published": "2026-11-18T09:17:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99319"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-99319 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-99319"
]
}
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