AZL-115324 (CVE-2026-99586)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-11-20 06:17 – Updated: 2026-11-21 05:31 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-99586 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Handle ARM erratum for CONT under invalidation with SVA

The erratum (MMU-700: #3777127, S3: #3673557) deals with under invalidation of a CONT PTE grouping in the SMMU. The recommended work around is to use a range invalidation that spans the entire CONT. The only user of CONT in the kernel right now is through SVA sharing a CPU page table that contains a CONT created by the mm.

Previously it was thought that this errata was dealt with because the driver always uses range invalidation. However, there is a subtle detail in the errata that the invalidation range must fully enclose the entire CONT for it to work.

It seems that two sequential range invalidations, with a split point falling inside a CONT grouping, will not prevent the errata.

The SMMU's range invalidation generation algorithm does not produce a single invalidation for a single SVA invalidation request, nor does the mm carefully align the SVA invalidation ranges to accommodate the splitting of the invalidation into several ranges.

Thus, when processing a SVA invalidation, the range invalidation splitting routine can generate a range invalidation that is split in the middle of the CONT and risk under invalidation from this errata. This condition could be triggered by a malicious userspace manipulating the TLB gathers via mmap/mprotect/munmap.

Update the errata list to the include the S3 variation, detect the IOMMUs that have it, and then have SVA invalidations use a simplified version of the over invalidation algorithm from the tlbi rework series. This ensures that a single range invalidation is issued for a single MMU notifier callback and now the range invalidation is guarenteed to cover any posible CONT.

Future work to add CONT to iommu_domain page tables should either use this one-invalidate/one-range invalidation algorithm or disable CONT support in the iommu_domain.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/arm-smmu-v3: Handle ARM erratum for CONT under invalidation with SVA\n\nThe erratum (MMU-700: #3777127, S3: #3673557) deals with under\ninvalidation of a CONT PTE grouping in the SMMU. The recommended work\naround is to use a range invalidation that spans the entire CONT. The only\nuser of CONT in the kernel right now is through SVA sharing a CPU page\ntable that contains a CONT created by the mm.\n\nPreviously it was thought that this errata was dealt with because the\ndriver always uses range invalidation. However, there is a subtle detail\nin the errata that the invalidation range must fully enclose the entire\nCONT for it to work.\n\nIt seems that two sequential range invalidations, with a split point\nfalling inside a CONT grouping, will not prevent the errata.\n\nThe SMMU\u0027s range invalidation generation algorithm does not produce a\nsingle invalidation for a single SVA invalidation request, nor does the mm\ncarefully align the SVA invalidation ranges to accommodate the splitting\nof the invalidation into several ranges.\n\nThus, when processing a SVA invalidation, the range invalidation splitting\nroutine can generate a range invalidation that is split in the middle of\nthe CONT and risk under invalidation from this errata. This condition\ncould be triggered by a malicious userspace manipulating the TLB gathers\nvia mmap/mprotect/munmap.\n\nUpdate the errata list to the include the S3 variation, detect the IOMMUs\nthat have it, and then have SVA invalidations use a simplified version of\nthe over invalidation algorithm from the tlbi rework series. This ensures\nthat a single range invalidation is issued for a single MMU notifier\ncallback and now the range invalidation is guarenteed to cover any posible\nCONT.\n\nFuture work to add CONT to iommu_domain page tables should either use this\none-invalidate/one-range invalidation algorithm or disable CONT support in\nthe iommu_domain.",
  "id": "AZL-115324",
  "modified": "2026-11-21T05:31:45Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:17:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99586"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-99586 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-99586"
  ]
}



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