AZL-48039 (CVE-2024-43859)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-08-17 10:15 – Updated: 2024-08-24 10:26 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to truncate preallocated blocks in f2fs_file_open()
chenyuwen reports a f2fs bug as below:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000011 fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx+0x78/0x1e8 f2fs_grab_read_bio+0x78/0x208 f2fs_submit_page_read+0x44/0x154 f2fs_get_read_data_page+0x288/0x5f4 f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x60/0x190 truncate_partial_data_page+0x108/0x4fc f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x344/0x5f0 f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x6c/0x134 f2fs_truncate+0xd8/0x200 f2fs_iget+0x20c/0x5ac do_garbage_collect+0x5d0/0xf6c f2fs_gc+0x22c/0x6a4 f2fs_disable_checkpoint+0xc8/0x310 f2fs_fill_super+0x14bc/0x1764 mount_bdev+0x1b4/0x21c f2fs_mount+0x20/0x30 legacy_get_tree+0x50/0xbc vfs_get_tree+0x5c/0x1b0 do_new_mount+0x298/0x4cc path_mount+0x33c/0x5fc __arm64_sys_mount+0xcc/0x15c invoke_syscall+0x60/0x150 el0_svc_common+0xb8/0xf8 do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 el0_svc+0x24/0x84 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
It is because inode.i_crypt_info is not initialized during below path: - mount - f2fs_fill_super - f2fs_disable_checkpoint - f2fs_gc - f2fs_iget - f2fs_truncate
So, let's relocate truncation of preallocated blocks to f2fs_file_open(), after fscrypt_file_open().
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43859 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.47.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.47.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix to truncate preallocated blocks in f2fs_file_open()\n\nchenyuwen reports a f2fs bug as below:\n\nUnable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000011\n fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx+0x78/0x1e8\n f2fs_grab_read_bio+0x78/0x208\n f2fs_submit_page_read+0x44/0x154\n f2fs_get_read_data_page+0x288/0x5f4\n f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x60/0x190\n truncate_partial_data_page+0x108/0x4fc\n f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x344/0x5f0\n f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x6c/0x134\n f2fs_truncate+0xd8/0x200\n f2fs_iget+0x20c/0x5ac\n do_garbage_collect+0x5d0/0xf6c\n f2fs_gc+0x22c/0x6a4\n f2fs_disable_checkpoint+0xc8/0x310\n f2fs_fill_super+0x14bc/0x1764\n mount_bdev+0x1b4/0x21c\n f2fs_mount+0x20/0x30\n legacy_get_tree+0x50/0xbc\n vfs_get_tree+0x5c/0x1b0\n do_new_mount+0x298/0x4cc\n path_mount+0x33c/0x5fc\n __arm64_sys_mount+0xcc/0x15c\n invoke_syscall+0x60/0x150\n el0_svc_common+0xb8/0xf8\n do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0\n el0_svc+0x24/0x84\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec\n\nIt is because inode.i_crypt_info is not initialized during below path:\n- mount\n - f2fs_fill_super\n - f2fs_disable_checkpoint\n - f2fs_gc\n - f2fs_iget\n - f2fs_truncate\n\nSo, let\u0027s relocate truncation of preallocated blocks to f2fs_file_open(),\nafter fscrypt_file_open().",
"id": "AZL-48039",
"modified": "2024-08-24T10:26:52Z",
"published": "2024-08-17T10:15:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43859"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-43859 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.47.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-43859"
]
}
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