AZL-49746 (CVE-2024-42297)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-08-17 09:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2024-42297 affecting package kernel for versions less than 5.15.167.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

f2fs: fix to don't dirty inode for readonly filesystem

syzbot reports f2fs bug as below:

kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:933! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1576/0x1590 fs/f2fs/inode.c:933 Call Trace: evict+0x2a4/0x620 fs/inode.c:664 dispose_list fs/inode.c:697 [inline] evict_inodes+0x5f8/0x690 fs/inode.c:747 generic_shutdown_super+0x9d/0x2c0 fs/super.c:675 kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1667 kill_f2fs_super+0x303/0x3b0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4894 deactivate_locked_super+0xc1/0x130 fs/super.c:484 cleanup_mnt+0x426/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1256 task_work_run+0x24a/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:180 ptrace_notify+0x2cd/0x380 kernel/signal.c:2399 ptrace_report_syscall include/linux/ptrace.h:411 [inline] ptrace_report_syscall_exit include/linux/ptrace.h:473 [inline] syscall_exit_work kernel/entry/common.c:251 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:278 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x15c/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:88 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

The root cause is: - do_sys_open - f2fs_lookup - __f2fs_find_entry - f2fs_i_depth_write - f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync - f2fs_dirty_inode - set_inode_flag(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE)

  • umount
  • kill_f2fs_super
  • kill_block_super
  • generic_shutdown_super
    • sync_filesystem : sb is readonly, skip sync_filesystem()
    • evict_inodes
    • iput
    • f2fs_evict_inode
    • f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE)) : trigger kernel panic

When we try to repair i_current_depth in readonly filesystem, let's skip dirty inode to avoid panic in later f2fs_evict_inode().

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:2 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 5.15.167.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.15.167.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix to don\u0027t dirty inode for readonly filesystem\n\nsyzbot reports f2fs bug as below:\n\nkernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:933!\nRIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1576/0x1590 fs/f2fs/inode.c:933\nCall Trace:\n evict+0x2a4/0x620 fs/inode.c:664\n dispose_list fs/inode.c:697 [inline]\n evict_inodes+0x5f8/0x690 fs/inode.c:747\n generic_shutdown_super+0x9d/0x2c0 fs/super.c:675\n kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1667\n kill_f2fs_super+0x303/0x3b0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4894\n deactivate_locked_super+0xc1/0x130 fs/super.c:484\n cleanup_mnt+0x426/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1256\n task_work_run+0x24a/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:180\n ptrace_notify+0x2cd/0x380 kernel/signal.c:2399\n ptrace_report_syscall include/linux/ptrace.h:411 [inline]\n ptrace_report_syscall_exit include/linux/ptrace.h:473 [inline]\n syscall_exit_work kernel/entry/common.c:251 [inline]\n syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:278 [inline]\n __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline]\n syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x15c/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:296\n do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:88\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\n\nThe root cause is:\n- do_sys_open\n - f2fs_lookup\n  - __f2fs_find_entry\n   - f2fs_i_depth_write\n    - f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync\n     - f2fs_dirty_inode\n      - set_inode_flag(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE)\n\n- umount\n - kill_f2fs_super\n  - kill_block_super\n   - generic_shutdown_super\n    - sync_filesystem\n    : sb is readonly, skip sync_filesystem()\n    - evict_inodes\n     - iput\n      - f2fs_evict_inode\n       - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE))\n       : trigger kernel panic\n\nWhen we try to repair i_current_depth in readonly filesystem, let\u0027s\nskip dirty inode to avoid panic in later f2fs_evict_inode().",
  "id": "AZL-49746",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
  "published": "2024-08-17T09:15:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42297"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CVE-2024-42297 affecting package kernel for versions less than 5.15.167.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-42297"
  ]
}



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