AZL-50942 (CVE-2024-50048)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-10-21 20:15 – Updated: 2024-10-31 05:18 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbcon: Fix a NULL pointer dereference issue in fbcon_putcs
syzbot has found a NULL pointer dereference bug in fbcon. Here is the simplified C reproducer:
struct param { uint8_t type; struct tiocl_selection ts; };
int main() { struct fb_con2fbmap con2fb; struct param param;
int fd = open("/dev/fb1", 0, 0);
con2fb.console = 0x19;
con2fb.framebuffer = 0;
ioctl(fd, FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP, &con2fb);
param.type = 2;
param.ts.xs = 0; param.ts.ys = 0;
param.ts.xe = 0; param.ts.ye = 0;
param.ts.sel_mode = 0;
int fd1 = open("/dev/tty1", O_RDWR, 0);
ioctl(fd1, TIOCLINUX, ¶m);
con2fb.console = 1;
con2fb.framebuffer = 0;
ioctl(fd, FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP, &con2fb);
return 0;
}
After calling ioctl(fd1, TIOCLINUX, ¶m), the subsequent ioctl(fd, FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP, &con2fb) causes the kernel to follow a different execution path:
set_con2fb_map -> con2fb_init_display -> fbcon_set_disp -> redraw_screen -> hide_cursor -> clear_selection -> highlight -> invert_screen -> do_update_region -> fbcon_putcs -> ops->putcs
Since ops->putcs is a NULL pointer, this leads to a kernel panic. To prevent this, we need to call set_blitting_type() within set_con2fb_map() to properly initialize ops->putcs.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50048 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.57.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.57.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfbcon: Fix a NULL pointer dereference issue in fbcon_putcs\n\nsyzbot has found a NULL pointer dereference bug in fbcon.\nHere is the simplified C reproducer:\n\nstruct param {\n\tuint8_t type;\n\tstruct tiocl_selection ts;\n};\n\nint main()\n{\n\tstruct fb_con2fbmap con2fb;\n\tstruct param param;\n\n\tint fd = open(\"/dev/fb1\", 0, 0);\n\n\tcon2fb.console = 0x19;\n\tcon2fb.framebuffer = 0;\n\tioctl(fd, FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP, \u0026con2fb);\n\n\tparam.type = 2;\n\tparam.ts.xs = 0; param.ts.ys = 0;\n\tparam.ts.xe = 0; param.ts.ye = 0;\n\tparam.ts.sel_mode = 0;\n\n\tint fd1 = open(\"/dev/tty1\", O_RDWR, 0);\n\tioctl(fd1, TIOCLINUX, \u0026param);\n\n\tcon2fb.console = 1;\n\tcon2fb.framebuffer = 0;\n\tioctl(fd, FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP, \u0026con2fb);\n\n\treturn 0;\n}\n\nAfter calling ioctl(fd1, TIOCLINUX, \u0026param), the subsequent ioctl(fd, FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP, \u0026con2fb)\ncauses the kernel to follow a different execution path:\n\n set_con2fb_map\n -\u003e con2fb_init_display\n -\u003e fbcon_set_disp\n -\u003e redraw_screen\n -\u003e hide_cursor\n -\u003e clear_selection\n -\u003e highlight\n -\u003e invert_screen\n -\u003e do_update_region\n -\u003e fbcon_putcs\n -\u003e ops-\u003eputcs\n\nSince ops-\u003eputcs is a NULL pointer, this leads to a kernel panic.\nTo prevent this, we need to call set_blitting_type() within set_con2fb_map()\nto properly initialize ops-\u003eputcs.",
"id": "AZL-50942",
"modified": "2024-10-31T05:18:59Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T20:15:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50048"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-50048 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.57.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-50048"
]
}
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