AZL-51168 (CVE-2024-50057)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-10-21 20:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tipd: Free IRQ only if it was requested before
In polling mode, if no IRQ was requested there is no need to free it. Call devm_free_irq() only if client->irq is set. This fixes the warning caused by the tps6598x module removal:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 333 at kernel/irq/devres.c:144 devm_free_irq+0x80/0x8c ... ... Call trace: devm_free_irq+0x80/0x8c tps6598x_remove+0x28/0x88 [tps6598x] i2c_device_remove+0x2c/0x9c device_remove+0x4c/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x1cc/0x228 driver_detach+0x50/0x98 bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc driver_unregister+0x30/0x60 i2c_del_driver+0x54/0x64 tps6598x_i2c_driver_exit+0x18/0xc3c [tps6598x] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x184/0x264 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xe8 do_el0_svc+0x20/0x2c el0_svc+0x28/0x98 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50057 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: tipd: Free IRQ only if it was requested before\n\nIn polling mode, if no IRQ was requested there is no need to free it.\nCall devm_free_irq() only if client-\u003eirq is set. This fixes the warning\ncaused by the tps6598x module removal:\n\nWARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 333 at kernel/irq/devres.c:144 devm_free_irq+0x80/0x8c\n...\n...\nCall trace:\n devm_free_irq+0x80/0x8c\n tps6598x_remove+0x28/0x88 [tps6598x]\n i2c_device_remove+0x2c/0x9c\n device_remove+0x4c/0x80\n device_release_driver_internal+0x1cc/0x228\n driver_detach+0x50/0x98\n bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc\n driver_unregister+0x30/0x60\n i2c_del_driver+0x54/0x64\n tps6598x_i2c_driver_exit+0x18/0xc3c [tps6598x]\n __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x184/0x264\n invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xe8\n do_el0_svc+0x20/0x2c\n el0_svc+0x28/0x98\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158\n el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194",
"id": "AZL-51168",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T20:15:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50057"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-50057 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-50057"
]
}
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